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When abstraction sets to killing you, 
you’ve got to get busy with it 
 
The Plague (La Peste), 







The objective of this dissertation is to question the plausibility of the multiple 
realizability theory and the method of analysis it entails, opening to a theoretical 
alternative which can be grounded on a different methodology. 
Forty years have passed since Hilary Putnam’s article “Psychological 
Predicates” (1967) in which he formalized his famous argument in favour of the 
multiple realizations of mental states. His declared intention was to attack the theory 
of behavioural disposition and the identity theory, presenting a new approach based 
on the identification between mental processes and the ones performed by a specific 
virtual machine: the probabilistic automaton. Beside these goals, it is likely that 
Putnam also intended to challenge all the reductionist approaches to the study of mind 
denying any other relation between mental and physical states but the contingent one. 
As a result, the new functionalist approach could focus directly on the information 
processes implemented by biological systems making of the “sets of instructions” and 
the “functional states” the new subjects of mind analysis. 
A few years later, Fodor (1974) moved farther starting from Putnam’s position, 
making the irreducibility of “special sciences” (i.e. every psychological or social 
science) the necessary consequence of the assumption of the multiple realizability of 
mental states. The generalised version of the theory made the mental states multiply 
realizable by the same correlate structure over time, bringing forth the rejection of all 
possible fixed identities, even when established between the processes in an organism 
and a single “best description” of the processes in the correspondent virtual machine. 
The concept of a “functional state” became more abstract to escape all forms of 
identity, causing a shift  that moved the new generalised version of the theory far from 
Putnam’s early formalization, altering the reference of the main object of the multiple 
realizations, which became the vague “function”. 
In the last four decades, the theory has evolved significantly both in the way it 
has been used as an argument against reductionism and in the reasoning used to 
sustain it. In this dissertation, I propose to distinguish two main periods: the first lasts 
for nearly three decades and it is characterised by a general acceptance of the main 
argument for the multiple realizability, focusing the controversy on its implications on 
the problem of reduction –Fodor’s autonomy of special sciences and Jaegwon Kim’s 




On the contrary, in the nineties, and more frequently in the last ten years, a new phase 
has started, which is centred on two foci: on one hand there is a strong challenge to 
the conceivability of the main argument itself (Zangwill 1992, Shapiro 2000). On the 
other hand some philosophers are now stressing the failures in the predictions implied 
by the generalised theory: neuroscience is having a great impact in the study of 
psychological and social sciences and most of its studies are successfully carried out 
assuming an across-species neural substrate that may be reconciled with the multiple 
realizability theory or may deny it, depending on the grain of analysis adopted 
(Bechtel and Mundale, 1999). 
Nonetheless, neuroscience findings do not lead by themselves to abandon the 
hypothesis that mental states are multiply realised in several neural correlates. It is 
sufficient to consider that, using a fine grain of analysis, even if we consider neural 
systems belonging to the same species, it is not possible to find two perfectly identical 
ones: it is not then a surprise that neuroscience findings have been used both to sustain 
and to oppose the hypothesis for reduction, when they are asked to give an account of 
multiple realizations. 
In this dissertation I propose my contribution to the controversy assuming a 
connectionist perspective: an approach that has been so far disregarded in this 
particular context. My strategy consists in accepting the idea that it is useful to 
analyse organisms as information processing systems, but I will claim that Putnam’s 
hypothesis relies on a double misconception. Appealing to Copeland’s (2002) article 
about the Church-Turing thesis, I will try to demonstrate in the second chapter that 
these false beliefs concern which type of mathematical functions can be considered 
computable by which kind of device. Namely, philosophers usually forget that Turing 
machines cannot replicate every possible mathematical function and it is yet to be 
demonstrated if they are able to perform the specific mathematical functions 
computed by neural systems. 
Such a result may be only achieved with an empirical study of parallel system 
processes and I am convinced that, from a mathematical perspective, these two classes 
of systems (the first serial, the second parallel) share little or nothing, so that one 
cannot process the information as the other does it. If the organisms do not process 
information in the way probabilistic automata do it, then the identification of the 
mental state with a functional state collapses, making the hypothesis of multiple 




The early version can be questioned with a mathematical approach, but the 
generalised version escapes this “fate” thanks to the abstract (or elusive) reference 
attributed to the term of its investigation, the “function”. I will then rise a series of 
objections against the possibility of identifying the function realised by a system with 
the behaviour generated by a mental state (in terms of evolutionary psychology) or 
with the “main task” accomplished by a generic device. I see this defining strategy as 
affected by a general vagueness due to its aim for abstraction and to its dependence 
from the point of view of the describer of the function. Nevertheless, even if it were 
possible to establish a shared method for the identification of the functions in the 
generalised version of the theory, this strategy would lead inevitably to a partial 
description of the phenomenon analysed. 
In the early version of the theory, Putnam could reach a complete description of 
the processes realized by an organism thanks to the identification of these with the 
ones performed by the correspondent virtual machine. The generalised version of the 
theory cannot reach the same result and its analysis focuses on single parts of the 
whole system. Generally speaking, my thesis is that partial descriptions may be useful 
in some contexts (i.e. if we do not have direct access to the phenomenon analysed and 
its complete description), but they fail to give us exhaustive explanations and should 
be considered weak as the ground for an explanatory model.  
Moreover, partial descriptions are likely to affect negatively our understanding 
of complex phenomena: it is usually taken for granted that a part of the system, once 
separated from the whole, would still be analysable as performing the same processes 
and functions. A similar assumption is often mistaken as plausible concerning the data 
analysed: each selection may lead to a different understanding of the processes that 
generate those particular data. 
The first assumption is easily falsified in this context on the basis of the 
mathematical description of the processes performed by parallel systems: every 
attempt to isolate a part of the system leads to the generation of a different, new 
system. The double-slit experiment, which is famously used in physics to show the 
double nature of matter, is then used to exemplify how the selection of the data gives 
the observer two representations of the phenomenon leading to incompatible models. 
In conclusion, the thesis here supported is that the tool of neural computation 
may lead us in the near future to complete descriptions relying on the “mathematical 




performed by the system) and these can only be formalized studying the physical 
matter that generates them. 
As far as multiple realizability is concerned, I consider it a necessary tool rather 
than an explanatory theory: whenever the processes in a system “A” are not 
accessible, they can be investigated by means of the assumption that another system 
“B”, whose processes are accessible, is partially realizing the same (or similar) 
processes. The reasoning will lead to an analogy, but the descriptions achieved should 
not be confused with those which refer directly to “A”, because it is necessary to bear 
in mind that they refer to a system that is assumed to be similar. Consequently, the 
assumption itself (and all the descriptions it allows) can be falsified the very moment 
the system “A” becomes accessible thanks to new tools of analysis which are bringing 




                                                
Chapter 1 
 
1. Putnam’s overwhelmingly plausible idea. In the late sixties Hilary 
Putnam published a series of papers introducing the thesis of multiple realizability in 
the theory of philosophy of mind. Above all, “Psychological Predicates” (1967)1 is 
commonly recognised as the pivotal attempt to formalize this theory giving a new 
explanation of the relation between the mind and the body (or, as Putnam himself 
stated years later, resuming and modifying the ancient Aristotelian hylomorphism). 
At the time Putnam wrote his articles, Feigl and Smart’s psychoneural identity 
theory was widely accepted: their “type physicalism” supported a type-to-type 
identity between brain states (or sometimes the theoretical assumption of a physical 
“C-Nerve fibre activation”) and mental states which was only challenged by anti-
physicalist position. Putnam’s arguments radically changed this dichotomy, focusing 
for the first time on the processes that give origin to the mental state and famously 
associating the mind with a virtual machine. Putnam’s main innovation, particularly if 
his theory is considered in relation to traditional approaches to the study of the mind –
namely, physicalist monism and Cartesian dualism–, consists in allowing a physicalist 
position that unbinds the study of the mind from the study of the matter that generates 
it2. It is due to this innovation if the theory could resist for a long period to the 
challenges coming from the field of neuroscience, maintaining its philosophical 
appeal in spite of the numerous changes and findings that have characterised the brain 
studies in the last four decades. 
Putnam starts his article with an analysis of the usual criticisms against type-
physicalism concluding that they fail to reach their target because they are wrongly 
addressed. In order to show the reasons of these failures, according to the author it is 
first necessary to underline the implications an identity has when it is used within 
analytical philosophy. The statement “A is B” (which stands for “being A is being B”) 
 
1 The article was first published in Art, Mind and Religion, eds. W. H. Capitan and D. D. 
Merrill (Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), pp. 37-48. It was reprinted 
in 1975 with the new title “The Nature of Mental States” in Mind, Language and Reality, 
pp. 429-440 and the subsequent reprints use the latter title. In this dissertation I will always 
refer to the 1999 reprinted version for the anthology “Mind and Cognition” edited by W.G. 
Lycan. See references for details. 
2 In section 3 it will be analysed how this innovation has been questioned by a series of article 





should be considered correct if and only if it follows from what A and B mean and it 
must be reductive in order to be informative. 
Grounding his analysis on this definition, Putnam rejects the hypothesis that 
there is a linguistic violation in statements such as “the mental state A is a brain state 
B”. The hypothesis suggests that the condition of being aware of experiencing a 
mental state (for instance, pain) does not entail being aware of any correspondent 
brain state. Putnam does not question this hypothesis, but he claims that the only 
consequence that can be drawn from it is that the two kinds of knowledge rely on two 
distinguished concepts. As a matter of fact, granted the previously mentioned 
definition, every informative identity has to be established between two concepts: 
supporting this argument against type-physicalism would consequently make all 
scientific identities unacceptable (e.g. “water is H2O”, “heat is molecular kinetic 
energy” and so forth). 
This is not the only hypothesis the author analyses that should be extended (if 
properly used) to all scientific statements concerning identities. A second strategy 
consists in assuming that an identity entails that the properties that characterise the 
two elements involved, must be synonyms. According to the author, such a use of an 
identity would lead to make the two notions of “property” and “concept” collapse in a 
single one. The problem becomes clear once this reasoning is applied to recognised 
identities in physics: Putnam uses the example of the temperature associated to kinetic 
energy showing how the statement “A is B” is characterised by a different truth value 
than “the concept of A is the same concept of B”; namely, the first statement is true, 
whilst the second is false. 
Finally, a third strategy that entails an extension of its conclusion to all scientific 
identities consists in assuming that the properties involved in an identity invariantly 
correlate with each other (i.e. an attempt to avoid the controversy of causal relation as 
well as identities). The author shows how this assumption does not lead to a solution 
of the problem. A correlation between two properties would simply cause a change in 
the question from “is A B?” to “what makes A correlate with B?”. Furthermore, once 
the reasoning is extended to every scientific identity, it entails doubting the existence 
of any causal relation (which is substituted by invariant correlation) or considering 





A third commonly used theoretical hypothesis against the identity theory is 
based on the assumption that it should be possible to establish a rigid spatiotemporal 
association between the two properties involved in the identity, in order to have a 
proper identification. Thus, since the sensation of pain in my arm clearly does not 
share its location in the space with the status of activation in the brain, the identity 
“pain in my arm is such-and-such brain state” should not be accepted. This 
assumption is rejected by Putnam who claims that apparently nobody would be 
confident of using the same strategy to demonstrate that the surface of the mirror is 
not actually reflecting lights, despite the fact that we perceive the reflected objects as 
if they were “behind” the mirror itself. 
These analyses of the usual criticism against the identity theory lead Putnam to 
conclude that one cannot argue with the hypothesis that a mental state and a certain 
physical state in the brain (or the nervous system) exemplify two different properties. 
Consequently, since the aim is to discuss what pain “is”, the question whether there is 
a proper identification between the two properties is still open. 
At this point, Putnam presents his famous argument: 
 
Consider what the brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claims. 
He has to specify a physical-chemical state such that any organism (not 
just a mammalian) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a brain of a 
suitable physical-chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical-
chemical state. (Putnam 1967, 31). 
 
Putnam considers obvious that every animal, independently from the species or 
class it belongs to (i.e. mollusca as well as mammals or reptiles), is capable of being 
in the particular mental state that corresponds to pain. Furthermore, considering this 
criterion, the mental state of pain must be identical for every creature (i.e. there is no 
such a thing as a specific human or mollusc pain) and there is no reason to doubt that 
even hypothetical creatures like aliens or artificial silicon-based system can be also 
conceived as characterised by the same mental state of pain. 
As a consequence, if pain is a certain C-Fiber activation, then all the creatures in 
the universe capable of feeling pain should share the same neural structure and the 
same neural activation at the right moment. Of course even if we consider, as Putnam 




the argument is extended to every psychological predicate, it becomes 
overwhelmingly plausible that these multiple realizations of the mental states across 
species simply cannot be explained by any theory grounded on the identity between 
mental and physical states. After all, even if parallel evolution could be proved in all 
known creatures, this would be a weak defence of the theory: the conceivability of 
artificial intelligent systems not based on biological neural networks but still capable 
of feeling pain, would definitively discard the identity theory. 
It is interesting to stress how Putnam’s arguments rely on his use of deductions 
concerning neurophysiology and neuroanatomy, so that the tools used by reductionist 
philosophers are overturned against physical reductionism itself. Rather than trying to 
disprove the identity theory using a priori assumptions, this vivid argument 
(sometimes referred to as the likelihood argument) makes the theory sound highly 
implausible. 
Putnam’s explicit strategy is then to argue that there is another approach to the 
mind that allows a more plausible explanatory model of what mental states are. To 
this end, he introduces the concept of the probabilistic automaton, a device similar to 
a Turing Machine (TM) characterised by a different organization of the transition 
between states. A TM is a computational -serial- device that is instructed by a 
program (set of instructions) to process a symbolic input in order to give a symbolic 
output as a result. A device that simulates any possible TM is called Universal TM 
(UTM): in this case, there are sets of inputs that are processed by the machine to 
generate the correspondent sets of instructions. In other words, the UTM is directly 
programmed by the input which instructs the machine on the processes to apply from 
that moment onwards. 
Given the input, a TM follows its program step by step -and this is the reason 
why I mentioned before that it is a serial system- in what is called a transition between 
states. If and only if the correct conditions are verified, the transition necessarily 
occurs allowing the machine to change its state of origin into a new one, described by 
its set of instructions: in other words, a TM is characterised by an assignment of 
probabilities 1 or 0 to every transition. On the contrary, if the instructions allow the 
machine to change its status from the original one to a series of target ones (with 
probabilities assigned to each of them) then the machine is called “probabilistic 
automaton”: according to Putnam, this device describes the functional processes of an 




Putnam considers on one hand the signals generated by the sense organs as a 
physical realization of the symbolic input of the automaton and on the other hand the 
observable behaviour performed by the organism as the correspondent output. The 
probabilistic state transition allows the functional transformation of the input into the 
output and remains implicit representing the psychological states of the organism. 
Thus, it is possible to identify a mental state of an organism on the basis of its 
behaviour, even if the behaviour itself (as every output) is not necessary for the 
existence of the mental state. The behaviour is rather the manifestation of the inner 
state of the organism; using a metaphor, the behaviour plays the role of a warning 
light: it indicates the presence of the correspondent mental state if and only if it is 
working correctly. 
Putnam intentionally specifies his position in relation to the behaviour because 
he bears in mind the problems generated by the behavioural disposition theory. In 
contrast with this theory, Putnam’s use of observable behaviour does not fail in giving 
an account of those circumstances that characterise an organism which cannot 
perform a specific behaviour or any behaviour at all (e.g. due to paralysis). 
Behavioural disposition is considered by the author as a ‘hopelessly vague’ and 
‘clearly false’ (Putnam 1967, p. 33) theory: if the behaviour is only referred to what 
can be observed, then this theory is committed to claim that an animal whose motor 
nerves have been cut cannot be in the mental state of pain, just because it cannot 
perform the proper correspondent action. On the contrary, Putnam’s focus on the 
functional organization allows to explain the latter set of circumstances simply with 
an interruption in the state transitions: the animal will still feel pain, but this mental 
state cannot be processed until reaching the end of the usual chain of states, which 
results in the execution of the correspondent action. 
Once the focus is on the functional organization implemented by the 
probabilistic device, it follows that there are infinite systems able to implement these 
state transitions or singular functional states: the virtual machine is completely 
independent from any specific physical structure. If the state transitions implemented 
by two devices are perfectly mirrored, these two systems are functionally isomorphic, 
but this is not a necessary condition. Even if the sequence of states established by the 
program is different, two systems may still reach the same state in the virtual machine 




is independent of the others and it can be reached by the machine by means of 
different processes. 
The instructions the automaton realizes are neither species specific nor they 
have preferences for any sort of structures, such as, for instance, biological neural 
networks or microchips. Combining this hypothesis –contingency of the structure that 
implements the programs– with the features of the UTMs –the instructions of the 
program themselves may be given as an input–, Putnam concluded few years later 
with the famous statement: ‘we could be made of Swiss cheese and it wouldn't matter’ 
(Putnam 1975, p.291). 
In conclusion, the argument may be summarised considering the following 
relations: 
 
A r M 
B r M 
A ≠ B 
 
A and B stand for two neural structures belonging to different species, M is used 
to represent the psychological state and r stands for a relation that has to be 
established. Since A and B are given as not equal, if we suppose that the relation 
between them and M is an identity, this assumption would lead to the absurd: 
 
A = M 
B = M 
A = B  and  A ≠ B 
 
Putnam’s proposal is then to assume that A and B are not the mental state M but 
they realize it: the established relation is contingent and there can be infinite systems 
realizing the same relation with M thanks to different sets of instructions for state 
transitions. As a consequence, the focus changes from the reductionist study of the 
neural correlate to the functionalist study of the realized functions.  
 
 
2. Towards the autonomy of “Special Sciences”. In the few years 
following Putnam’s formalization, many attempts were made in order to make the 
identity theory compatible with the commonly recognised plausibility of the argument 




opportunity to have different kinds of identities depending on specific characteristics 
of the structure, though preserving the main principle. A frequently quoted example of 
how physical explanations allow multiple realizations in different microphysical 
contexts is represented by the identity between molecular kinetic energy and heat. It is 
known that this identity is true when it is referred to gas, whilst the temperature in 
solids or in liquids cannot be described exactly in the same way, even if the concept is 
still valid (e.g. in solids heat is defined as the maximal molecular kinetic energy).  
Nevertheless, in the case of psychological states, a physical identity still 
requires the identification of a type-structure or type-property feature of matter that 
could be identified with all the mental states of the same psychological kind. 
Putnam’s analysis of the chances for parallel evolution perfectly fits with this 
modified version of the identities, but it has been already stated that such a change in 
the identity theory would still lack the necessary plasticity that could make it sound 
plausible. Anyhow, even if we ignore these considerations, it would still be possible 
to conceive two functionally isomorphic systems grounded on parallel neural systems 
and serial microchips. Until recent years, this thought experiment has, per se, been 
considered as implying the rejection of the hypothesis. 
A more complex path to reconcile type identity theory with the assumption of 
multiple realizations of mental states may be established thanks to the so-called 
“functional state identity theory” (from now on, FSIT). This new identity theory can 
be considered as the direct consequence drawn from Putnam’s definition of the 
probabilistic automaton: Block and Fodor give an accurate analysis of this position in 
their 1972 article “What Psychological States are not”. 
According to the authors’ description, FSIT theorists consider the input of the 
device as constituted by sensory stimulation whilst the output represents the 
instructions for motor transducers, but contrarily to Putnam’s proposal, they assume 
the existence of a unique best description of the transition probabilities between 
mental states.  
The theory per se is neutral about what psychological predicates are, in that it 
simply requires to be applied to a device characterised by the ability to realize them. 
This new class of identities doesn’t imply that a specific device can be considered the 
only one capable of these realizations: from this point of view, it doesn’t matter 




human being; even in the same organism it might be applied to the entire person, a 
specific neural matter or the soul. 
Far from being grounded on ontological choices, Block and Fodor claim that 
this theory requires two assumptions: first, independently of what mental state are, 
they are supposed to be in strict correspondence with the virtual machine states. 
Secondly, there is only one best description of the transition between the states for 
each device. Nevertheless, considering these premises, the FSIT substantially 
modifies Putnam’s conceivability of the event of multiple realization of a mental state 
which would then happen if and only if the programs implemented by the devices are 
functionally isomorphic. Moreover, the theory allows a form of token-identities that, 
in principle, may become a backdoor for a physicalist attempt to conceive a new 
version of identities between physical and mental states, maintaining the one-to-one 
relation established in the FSIT. 
According to Block and Fodor, the theory cannot be accepted due to a series of 
weak points: first, it does not give an account of the distinction between dispositional 
states (e.g. beliefs and desires or other lasting inclinations) and occurrent states (e.g. 
sensations and feelings limited to the present time). The FSIT might give an 
explanation of the occurrent states thanks to the identity one-to-one established with 
the states of the virtual machine, but it is not possible to describe in this way a 
disposition because of its lasting feature, unless we don’t want to assume that they are 
composed of occurrent states (a position considered possible by the authors, but 
dosmissed because it is not empirically grounded and it would require an unjustified 
conceptual change). 
A second criticism, which will come in useful in the last sections, is centred on 
the fact that it is not possible to give a good explanation of how an organism is 
capable of simultaneous mental states (a condition which is assumed by the author to 
be experienced continuously). In order to justify this phenomenon the organism 
should be described thanks to several probabilistic automata operating in parallel; 
however, accepting this case would entail a denial of the assumption of the single best 
(and unique) description, which is instead necessary for the FSIT. 
Third, the identity between psychological and machine table states implies that 
multiple realizability of mental states is only limited to those cases that are consistent 
with functional isomorphism. A machine table state is identical to another if and only 




their probabilistic relations with the other table states are also identical. This 
assumption generates a strong restriction for multiple realizations and, according to 
the authors, it ignores the nomological possibility for two functionally identical 
mental states to have different qualitative contents (expressing different qualia). 
Finally, a fourth argument raised by the authors appeals to the insufficient 
abstraction of the theory in its relation with multiple realizability. This criticism has 
already been used by the authors against behaviourist and physicalist identities (in a 
way which is close to Putnam’s standard arguments): the problem relies once again on 
the restriction for multiple realizations of mental states to functionally isomorphic 
virtual machine. There is no obvious reason to establish a law-like relation between a 
single mental state and the whole program that becomes necessary in order to realize 
it, once the FSIT is accepted. 
The authors’ conclusion is that every type of identity implies a systematic 
failure: firstly because it cannot give an account of temporal constancy of 
dispositional psychological states and secondly due to its rigidity in relation to the 
variety of realizations of the mental states. The sciences grounded on the study of the 
mind are characterised by a general complexity that avoids the strict one-to-one law 
imposed by identity theories, independently of the way they are grounded: behaviours 
(psychological states may have different manifestations), physical states (the problem 
of the across-species neural correlate) and, it is now necessary to add, virtual machine 
states (as hypothesised by the FSIT and rejected in the article just analysed). 
The assumption that any type of identity is to fail when it is used in relation to 
the study of psychological predicates commits to claim a special autonomy for those 
sciences which are connected to the study of the mind: these are indeed the so-called 
“special sciences”. Just two years after the coming out of Block and Fodor’s attack on 
type identities, Jerry Fodor extended Putnam’s antireductionist position in “Special 
Sciences (or: the disunity of science as a working hypothesis)” (1974) bringing forth 
the “generalised” version of multiple realizability theory. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, it is interesting to analyse the way Fodor 
introduces his argument, before dealing with the main focus of the generalized theory 
and its consequences for reductionist approaches. First, Fodor draws the relation 
established between token physicalism, type physicalism and reductionism which are 




                                                
1) The hypothesis developed in token physicalism is that special sciences describe 
events which are connected with physical ones by means of “bridge laws”. Since the 
relation supposed to be established between the two kinds of events is an identity, 
all sciences must be only interested in physical events. This approach should not be 
confused with the materialist one, which also claims that every possible event is a 
physical one. Token physicalism allows the existence of events which are not of the 
physical kind, namely those which are related to the “special sciences”: Fodor 
clearly states this key point in his reasoning drawing the conclusion that this form of 
physicalism is necessary but it is not sufficient both for type-physicalism and for 
reductionism. 
2) Type physicalism focuses on physical properties rather than on physical events: 
‘two events will be identical when they consist of the instantiation of the same 
property by the same individual at the same time’ (Fodor, 1974 p. 100). Type 
physicalism necessarily entails the token one, whilst the vice versa is not implied: 
the reason is that even a nomologically necessary identity may be contingent and, as 
a consequence, it would not imply the identity of the properties. It is still possible to 
conceive bridge laws that bind multiple physical events to a single non-physical 
one, generating a multiple realization that would deny any possible identity of 
properties. 
3) Reductionism is grounded on the assumption that all natural predicates in any 
ideally completed science (including the special ones, which at this point loose any 
feature that makes them “special”) may be reduced, by means of perfectly 
describable laws of reduction, to the natural predicates of an ideally3 completed 
physics. According to the author this, the strongest of the three assumptions, implies 
the unity of sciences 4 . Fodor clearly assumes reductionism entailing token 
 
3 The reference to the “ideally completed” science underlines Fodor’s interest in a criticism of 
the theoretical possibility of the existence of reductionism, rather than of the practical 
existence of complete reduction laws in contemporary science. I consider the point of 
particular interest especially when compared to the author’s use of findings coming from 
neuroscience field (see later on in this section) so that a model on theoretical possibilities of 
science is grounded on models generated by a science in its first years of development. 
4 For instance, the longest paths are usually conceived to be applied to political science and 
economics: these are reducible to physics thanks to a series of steps which start from the 
reduction of the firsts into sociology and goes on through psychology, biology, chemistry 
and finally gets to physics. The concept of reducibility entails an asymmetric relation 
between the reduced science and the ones it is reduced to: in agreement with reductionism, 





                                                
physicalism whilst, as with type physicalism, the vice versa is not a necessary 
implication due to, once again, the conceivability of contingent identity between 
physical and special science events. 
Starting from Putnam’s argument in support of multiple realizations of mental 
states, until Fodor’s analysis of types of physicalism, the theme of contingency recurs 
as a constant presence against any attempt to establish strict identities. Fodor’s 
objective is not to demonstrate that a single event may not be reduced to some 
physical event by means of some sort of bridge law. His intention is to demonstrate 
that it is not possible, starting from this form of reduction, to draw the conclusion that 
a specific token event related to special sciences is always bridged to the same token 
event in physics. That is to say, all mental states realized in a particular human in a 
given time are implemented by his or her neural system (assuming a reduction of 
psychology to neurology), but these are ‘nomologically necessary contingent event 
identities’ (Fodor 1974, 101), which do not imply reduction of properties and do not 
entail the existence of fixed ever-lasting laws per se. 
If we accept the definition the author uses, we are committed to accept that 
token physicalism allows the hypothesis that the psychological natural kind is not 
necessarily co-extensive with the neurological natural kind. If such co-extension could 
be established it seems likely to hypothesise that it is not law-like: if Putnam is right 
when he hypothesises the simulation of mental states by probabilistic automata, which 
are not based on neurological predicates, then, once again, the token identity is 
characterised by a contingent relation. As a consequence, the other forms of 
physicalism are ‘foredoomed’ (Fodor’s word) to fail in their attempt to give an 
account of special science phenomena because they require a relation grounded on 
necessary identities. 
Nevertheless, Fodor does not think the identification between mind processes 
and virtual machine ones is sufficient to support the autonomy of the special sciences 
towards reductionism. This is the reason why his pièce de résistance consists in 
appealing to physiological psychologists Karl Lashley: Fodor claims that only coarse 
correspondences may be established between types of psychological states and types 
of neurological states5: the nervous system of higher organisms is typically able to 
 
5 A fine correspondence may be established between token-events, but it has been already 
stated that this assumption would not entail an identity between properties, which is 




accomplish a single psychological task in a wide variety of ways by means of several 
neurological parts of the whole structure. Herein lies the pivotal difference between 
Putnam’s appeal to contingency and Fodor’s one: the role that time plays in the 
identity relations between psychological and physical states allows to generalise the 
original theory of multiple realizations on the basis of the neuroscience puzzle about 
the plasticity of the cortex: 
 
Imagine a world in which such [type-to-type] correlations are not 
forthcoming. What is found, instead, is that for every n-tuple of type 
identical psychological events, there is a spatiotemporally correlated n-
tuple of type distinct neurological events. (Fodor 1974, 106 italics in the 
original text). 
 
Fodor’s argument is intuitively effective: considering the same token-system, at 
different times it is possible to imagine that psychological states of the same kind may 
be realised by more than a single type of neural correlate. If the assumption shows to 
be true, type-identity theory is consequently rejected because it necessarily requires 
constancy in the elements that generate the identification: time cannot be a variable of 
the model. 
This is not a theoretical speculation: its empirical support consists of the known 
phenomena of neural degeneracy and plasticity which were both used with good 
results by Lashley to belittle the numerous attempts to generate both a specific map of 
the human cortex and a coarse map of cortices that might be meaningful across 
species. The degeneracy is a characteristic feature of the cortex, particularly studied in 
human beings, which results in the ability to offset damages in the structure caused by 
traumas or diseases: different regions have been proved to modify their supposed 
cognitive function in order to compensate for the missing ones performed by the 
damaged area. The plasticity refers to the dynamic nature of the whole brain and it has 
been described in the cortex of superior mammals: even in those subjects which have 
not been affected by major traumas or diseases, complex biological neural systems 
change their micro-architecture all along the life of the organism. These micro 
alterations are caused by genetic dispositions, external stimulations, but they also 
depend on completely stochastic reasons. 





A r M 
B r M 
A ≠ B 
 
First, Fodor’s generalized argument shows a single token structure considered in 
two different times in place of the former distinction between the two neural 
correlates A and B (i.e. A = B). Secondly, M1 and M2 represent two different mental 
states (i.e. M1 ≠ M2) which take the place of the single mental state M that 
characterises Putnam’s theory. As a consequence, Fodor’s definition of token 
physicalism would lead to the following contradiction:  
 
A = M1  (in t1) 
A = M2  (in t2) 
M1 = M2 and M1 ≠ M2
 
The only way to use an identity in place of the generic relation r is to assume 
that physical laws are not constant in time, an assumption which is of course 
unacceptable. The relations are confirmed to be contingent even when they are 
applied to a single token device. Therefore, Fodor’s generalized multiple realizability 
supports the idea that it is not possible to reduce psychological states to physical laws: 
the ‘special sciences’ reach a higher level of abstraction and must claim their 
independence. 
In the second chapter of this dissertation I will deal with the problems that, in 
my opinion, are arising from this appeal to a higher level of abstraction: for the time 
being it is important to point out that in Putnam’s early version of the multiple 
realizability theory there is no mention of the term “function”. It is rather the 
“functional state” of a virtual machine that is the subject of multiple realizations: it 
simulates in the virtual devices the psychological predicates or mental states which 
are implemented by biological systems. Even if Putnam does not define clearly what 
he means by a psychological predicate, it seems plausible that these are synonymous 
with the functional states, thanks to the hypothesised possibility to simulate the former 
by means of the latter. 
In Fodor’s generalization the “psychological functions”, or simply “functions”, 
take the place of the functional states with the intention of making the whole theory 




generalised form does not establish an identity between these particular functions and 
the functional states granting two functionally identical states to have different 
qualitative contents (as it as been explained dealing with criticisms against the FSIT). 
What is more, the functional state is defined as a single part in a complex transition 
process identified, in Putnam’s conception, in the probabilistic automata: these virtual 
machines consist in a complete description of how the input information is computed 
by means of all the possible transitions between states; consequently, observable 
behaviour becomes irrelevant for the definition of the state in the machine. Despite 
the fact they both appeal to the same concept of the virtual machine simulation of the 
mental, Putnam’s descriptive power can hardly be extended to the functions that 
characterise Fodor’s generalised theory. Their definition is usually taken for granted, 
probably because it is considered of immediate understanding, but, as a matter of fact, 
Fodor’s quest for abstraction commits him to abandon Putnam’s clear use of the 
subject of multiple realizations and paradoxically forces him at least to a partial 
appeal to the observable behaviour in the attempt to describe the nature of the 
functions he uses. 
Before moving forward to the next sections, it is useful to stress briefly the 
differences between Fodor’s generalised version of the multiple realizability theory 
and the standard “conceivability argument” (or “argument for imagination”, as it will 
addressed in section four), which is also used in support of the theory and was 
formalized in the same period. 
A classic example of the conceivability theory is represented by Kripke’s appeal 
to God’s intervention (Kripke 1972 p.153-154): this is an expedient used in order to 
let us conceive how the same C-Fibre stimulation may be “used” by God to make the 
organism feel pain, rather than warmth, or ticklishness or nothing at all. Based on the 
modal use of the terms necessity and possibility, Kripke claims that conceivability 
entails possibility and, as a consequence, that there is no necessary relation (such as a 
cause-effect) between any C-Fibre stimulation and a mental state. 
The conclusion reached by this new path matches the one described as the 
generalised theory: a single neural correlate may give rise to different psychological 
states in different times. Nonetheless, these two arguments must not be confused: 
Fodor’s appeal to Karl Lashley’s research in the field of neurophysiology allows him 
to take for granted as scientific evidence the multiple realizations of psychological 




[...]’ (Fodor 1974, 106) may be misleading, but it is to notice that Fodor never needs 
to explain the controversial assumption that conceivability always entails possibility: 
the mental experiment is used as an example, rather than the ground on which the 
whole thesis is built. In other words, it helps us to understand the argument, it is not 
the argument itself. 
In the coming sections, I will mainly address my arguments against Fodor’s 
theory and in support of reductionism so that, despite their apparent similarities, it is 
fair to point out that the objection raised against the generalised theory for multiple 
realizability cannot be applied to the conceivability argument, and vice versa. 
 
 
3. The “third way”: reconciling reductionism with multiple 
realizability. For more than two decades after Putnam’s formalization of the theory, 
the field of philosophy of mind was ruled by the arguments for multiple realizations. 
As a result, reductionist approaches to the mind fell from favour, surrounded by an 
atmosphere of naivety that made them not even worth being taken into serious 
consideration. 
At the beginning of the article ‘The myth of nonreductive materialism’, 
Jaegwon Kim (1989) briefly analyses the way reductionism was perceived by 
philosophers after the coming of multiple realizability theory: lacking the required 
plasticity and abstractness, this hypothesis was conceived as monolithic, rigidly bound 
to the attempt to establish a negative order and, even worst, reductionism started to be 
considered dogmatic at least every time it was applied to mind studies. 
According to the author, the functionalist position coming from the generalised 
version of the multiple realizability theory, carries on a new physicalism which asserts 
its freedom from the restrains of reductionism on the basis of a dichotomy. On one 
side, there is the “ontological physicalism”, which claims all existing objects in the 
space-time are physical. On the other side, the “property dualism” which claims the 
autonomy of psychological attributes in relation to the physical ones. 
 Kim’s article represents the first attempt to question this specific position, 
otherwise widely accepted. The author focuses on two topics, but for the purpose of 
this dissertation I will not deal with the arguments centred on Davidson’s “anomalous 
monism” (which is associated with an eliminativist position), giving here an account 




                                                
point out that the author is not concerned with arguing against the theory itself, which 
he considers plausible too: he is rather interested in discarding the hypothesis that this 
theory entails the existence of a physicalist approach which is neither reductionist, nor 
eliminativist. This intent is clearly stated in the article: 
 
I will claim that a physicalist has only two genuine options, eliminativism 
and reductionism. That is if you have already made your commitment to a 
version of physicalism worthy of the name, you must accept the 
reducibility of the psychological to the physical, or, failing that, you must 
consider the psychological as falling outside your physicalistically 
respectable ontology. (J. Kim 1989, p. 32) 
 
Kim starts analysing Putnam’s formalization of the theory, claiming that the 
main feature of multiple realizability consists in rejecting the hypothesis of the 
coextension of any physical state with the mental property it realizes. Therefore, the 
physical state is defined by the author as being “nomologically sufficient” for the 
realization of the mental, generating the already known relation: “A realizes M” or, 
using Kim’s symbols, Pi → M. 
At this point, Kim notices that both the choices of the examples in the theory 
and the words used by Putnam in his papers allow thinking that there is a species 
specificity in the latest relation, so that a better formulation would be: 
Si → (M ↔ Pi) 
which means that, within a specific structure Si, the relation established between 
M and Pi (the mental and the physical predicate) is both necessary and sufficient. Kim 
defines this relation as a ‘species-specific biconditional law’ (Kim 1989, p.38). 
Despite its name, which was explicitly chosen for its simplicity, this law is 
preferentially applied by the author to structures, rather than to biological species: the 
difference is slight if we consider that the neural structures of organisms belonging to 
the same species share a high percentage of their features. Nonetheless, the author 
states clearly that binding this law to a species would make it fail, due to the neural 
plasticity and the individual specific variations already highlighted by Lashley6. If, on 
the contrary, the law is applied to structure-specific types, it can be used to give an 
 




account of multiple realizability, and at the same time it entails a one-to-one relation 
between specific physical structures and the mental states it realizes. 
A defence of reductionism in mind studies does not need the author to claim that 
multiple realizability necessarily entails these local laws: it is sufficient that the theory 
can be considered consistent with them. This consistency would counter the line of 
argument that leads to the dismissal of every reductionist perspective by allowing 
these perspectives to be compatible with multiple realizations of mental states. 
In conclusion, Kim’s local reductionism is the strategy the author proposes to 
restore cause-effect relations between physical and mental kinds, establishing 
empirically verifiable laws. Each of these, restrained within specific species or 
structure, locates a single neural substrate that necessarily accomplishes the analysed 
cognitive capacity or function. 
Three years later, Kim dealt again with his theoretical proposal in the article: 
‘Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction’ (1992), which is this time 
entirely addressed to the argument of local reductionism. In order to clarify his 
argument, the author uses the example of the stone called jade, establishing an 
analogy with the commonly used example of pain in psychology. In the past this stone 
was believed to be a mineral characterised by specific features, the most recognisable 
being its green colour. Once it has been studied from a microphysical perspective, the 
stone proved to be a misconceived class composed of two different minerals: jadeite 
and nephrite which are characterised by similar macro-features and for this reason 
they were mistakenly considered the same stone. 
The question Kim rises is important: is the sentence “Jade is green” still a law? 
Apparently, it seems that the answer to this question is positive: the law-like 
expression supports counterfactuals and, using Kim’s words, it may show a 
“projectibility power”. But this is just an illusion: all the green samples of jade cannot 
imply the law “Jade is green”, because this is merely a conjunction of two other 
hypothetical laws –namely, “jadeite is green” and “nephrite is green”–. 
Kim asserts that in this example, there is no such a thing that can be considered 
a standard kind (not Kim’s expression) named “jade”, at least not in the way the term 
kind is normally used: the term “jade” rather refers to ‘a disjunction of two 
heterogeneous nomic kinds’ (Kim 1992, p.12), a disjunctive kind. As a matter of fact, 
this is the reason why there is no legitimate inductive projection that can be drawn 




author: if a single kind is used to refer to both nephrite and jadeite, all the samples that 
have ever been examined might be revealed to be samples of jadeite, rather than a mix 
of both minerals. As a consequence, the law cannot be extended to nephrite because 
there is no experience of this particular mineral. Accepting this law-like form would 
entail accepting that any law “X and Y are G” can be verified by “X is G” and, at the 
same time, this last law would imply “Y is G”, independently of what Y is. Of course, 
such a procedure is dismissed by Kim as illegitimate and confirmative. 
The reasoning that leads to local reductions is then straightforward. Jadeite and 
nephrite are considered distinct on the basis of their microphysical nature, that is to 
say, they show chemically different reactions (i.e. they are composed of different 
molecules), despite the fact they show similar macro-properties. Using this 
perspective, these two minerals can reasonably be considered two realizations of the 
kind “jade”, but nobody seems to have problems with their reduction to two different 
micro-structures, characterised by different chemical features. Therefore, Kim’s 
suggestion is to consider “pain” as a disjunctive kind and, consequently, to consider it 
a non-nomic class, characterised by a virtually endless set of nomologically possible 
realizations (animal species, artificial systems, alien forms, etc.). 
Kim’s position explicitly leads to the assumption that multiple realizability 
entails that mental kinds can be never considered “scientific” kinds because of their 
disjunctive feature. Nonetheless, it cannot be concluded from this that psychology is a 
pseudo-science, because it is still grounded on physical realizations: i.e. it concerns 
entities which are explainable in terms of physical laws and processes. The difference 
with another science such as, for instance, chemistry, is that psychology is only 
reducible within “fields” described by means of specific conditions: each law 
established within each field determines a local reduction and this is the only “field” 
where it can be applied validly. In the case of psychology, these conditions are 
(roughly, as it has been mentioned before) described by a species-specific structure. 
Finally, the inevitable conclusion of the author’s reasoning consists in claiming 
the multiple realizability of the whole psychology, as a direct consequence of the 
multiple realizability of each mental state:  
 
If physical realizations of psychological properties are a “wildly 




realized by an equally heterogeneous and unsystematic lot of physical 
theories. (Kim 1992, p. 20) 
 
Since each realization entails a different local reduction grounded on a different 
“specific local law”, an immediate objection to this theory consists in stressing how 
easily we are forced to allow local reductions which are only valid within small 
groups of organisms, or maybe even a single organism within the same species. Kim 
uses two arguments to defend his hypothesis from this criticism: first, 
neurophysiological researchers seem to have good reason to think that organisms 
belonging to the same species show important similarities that make it plausible that 
they also have similar realization processes (or local laws). Secondly, the 
physiological-biological differences should be considered in the same way as we 
usually consider psychological differences: if we are able to focus on the regularities 
of the psychological states, the same strategy must be conceded to the analysis of the 
structures. The differences are not simply ignored, on the contrary: psychological 
differences are explained thanks to differences in physiology. 
Incidentally, both these arguments can be considered the embryonic stage of 
Bechtel and Mundale’s appeal to a “different grain of analysis”, a thesis that the 
authors described few years later in their article ‘Multiple realizability revisited’ 
(1999). Interestingly, Kim uses them within the context established by multiple 
realizability, whilst I will describe in section five how Bechtel and Mundale 
developed and used the same arguments to reject the theory, starting from its 
premises. 
Directly mentioned in Kim’s article, Fodor wrote a strong criticism to this thesis 
in a follow-up article titled “Special Sciences: still autonomous after all these years” 
(1997). Kim’s entire proposal is rejected by Fodor, who attacks the foundations of the 
argument: concerning the kind “jade”, Fodor denies that this kind is an example of 
multiple realizations and questions about the reason why it is unprojectible. The 
pivotal reasoning in this criticism consists in considering the example of the jade as an 
example of sampling error, rather than an example of disjunction. Fodor states that 
should we discover that all our samples of green matter called “jade” are samples of  
jadeite, this finding would simply prove that we are grounding our inductive 
hypothesis on a biased population. A population of samples which is biased can be 




means that the data are equivocal, not that the hypotheses are unprojectible.’ (Fodor 
1997, p 152. Italics in the original text). 
Fodor concedes that jade can be used as a good example of disjunctive kind, but 
he stresses that this is not relevant for the debate: what functionalists argue is that 
there is a substantial difference between a property that is disjunctive and another that 
is multiply realized. According to the author, a properly named disjunctive property, 
for instance composed of “kind A” and “kind B”, is characterised by the metaphysical 
existence of worlds which can have either A or B or both. In contrast, a property 
which is disjunctively realised relies on different bases in different worlds. 
Fodor’s point is then explicit: the reason why pain can be considered 
nomologically homogeneous depends precisely on the ability to distinguish between 
these two kinds of disjunctions, conceding the functional description of pain its 
supervenience towards the heterogeneity of the physical matters that are contingently 
realizing pain itself. 
 
 
4. Challenging Multiple Realizability. Sporadically in the early nineties 
and more frequently in the last decade, the once unquestioned plausibility of the 
arguments in favour of the multiple realizations of mental states has been challenged 
in several articles. Suddenly, it has appeared that the whole idea of multiple 
realizability could be rejected because ill-grounded and vague in some of the terms 
used. 
The first example of this kind of radical criticism against the theory is 
represented by Zangwill’s short article “Variable Realization: Not Proved” (1992) in 
which the author briefly analyses three distinct arguments in support of the hypothesis 
of multiple realizability of mental states, pointing out what he thinks are their weak 
points. 
The question raised in the article is clearly stated by the author himself: given 
the negative claim of multiple realizability (asserting the non existence of a cause-
effect relation between type-mental and type-physical) and the consequent 
functionalist positive claim about a higher level of description which relies on the 
analysis of the functional states, the presence of functional isomorphic devices which 
show physical differences is a necessary consequence. However ‘how do we show 




state, and thus that it is functional organization which is important and not physical 
constitution?’ (Zangwill, 1992 p. 216). 
It is important to stress that Zangwill considers functionalism as always 
asserting the identity between mental and functional states: however, as it was 
described in section two of this dissertation, this assumption can only be considered 
true if it is applied to Putnam’s early version of multiple realizability theory and, as a 
consequence, to the early version of functionalism. As a matter of fact, Fodor’s 
generalised version already reached a level of abstraction that allows overtaking these 
identities. Despite these considerations, Zangwill’s question should still be considered 
as worth receiving an answer which is far from obvious. 
The first thesis analysed is defined as ‘the argument from imagination’: in this 
dissertation it has been referred to as the “conceivability argument” and it can be 
summarised in the mental experiment that allows us to imagine an alien organism or a 
silicon based device capable of being in a human mental state. Zangwill establishes a 
parallel between this mental experiment and another one which has been used as an 
anti-functionalist argument: the latter is centred on the problem of ‘qualia’ (i.e. 
qualitative or perceived experiences). The problem is that we can imagine two 
different organisms functionally isomorphic or sharing a particular functional state in 
a specific time and in spite of this, we can still imagine these two organisms 
experiencing (or being in) a different quale. Zangwill states that the common 
functionalist answer to the qualia objection results in a boomerang against the theory 
itself: the counter objections are summarised by the author as the claim that what is 
conceivable shouldn’t be necessarily considered possible or even real. Were it so, the 
fact itself that we can imagine such “conceivable situations” still would have to be 
shown (for instance, it seems that we imagine inverted qualia, when we actually do 
not). 
Thus, the author points out how the argument against the “quale hypothesis” can 
be easily used against the mental experiment of the alien organism or the silicon based 
device able to be in a human mental state. Zangwill’s analysis entails a divergent path 
that starts from the use of the argument from imagination. On one hand, accepting the 
functionalist counterargument implies a refutation of the appeal to the 
superimposition of what is conceivable over what is possible. On the other hand, if we 




it is possible to appeal to a further, higher, level of abstraction that denies the 
uniqueness (and therefore the validity) of functional descriptions of mental states. 
This second conclusion, which is not clearly stated in the article, but I think it is 
implied in the reasoning, is particularly useful for the purpose of this dissertation and 
the analysis of multiple realizability theory. The appeal to abstraction and a higher 
level of analysis, which are necessary for a functional state description, might lead to 
an infinite process towards further levels of abstraction. If the functional states are the 
descriptive superstructures of the organisms, the qualia can be conceived as a super-
superstructure of description: the problem starts if we accept that this process can be 
replicated infinite times, continuously appealing to new structures characterised by a 
higher and higher level of abstraction. 
The “conceptual argument” is the second analysed by Zangwill: he summarises 
it as the thesis that considers mental properties as essentially having a causal role in 
relation to other mental states and behaviours. Conceptually, the essence of mental 
properties does not rely on any physical matter but on its role and of course this 
assumption implies the multiple realizability of the causal roles (and consequently of 
mental states) independently of the contingent physical matter that realizes them. The 
author states that this assumption is implied by ‘a description theory for the meaning 
of mental terms’ (ibid., p.217), but it is perfectly possible to consider the role of the 
mental terms as a way to fix a posteriori their reference: in other words it is possible 
that philosophers are establishing how to define mental states after their causal role on 
other mental states and behaviours. If the second hypothesis is assumed true, the 
identification between mental states and causal roles becomes contingent whilst the 
identification between mental and physical states is again a legitimate hypothesis. 
In conclusion, the author does not express a preference as to the two types of 
relation established between causal roles and mental states: the point is that the 
question once again cannot be considered trivial and any answer is controversial. As a 
result, Zangwill disputes that a theory claimed to be undisputable and so widely 
accepted may be grounded on the conceptual argument. 
The third argument is named by the author as ‘empirical’ and it refers to the 
possibility of hard evidence that may clearly support the theory of multiple 
realizability. In his article, Zangwill states that currently there is no empirical 
evidence in favour of this theory, neither from an organism substantially different 




                                                
computers –whether composed by silicon microprocessors or cogs and wheels– which 
might have implemented forms of artificial intelligence that replicate the same mental 
states that characterise a generic living being. 
The likelihood of a hypothesis cannot be considered evidence by itself: it needs 
at least some weak empirical evidence to rely on, otherwise it falls in the first 
category of arguments analysed, based on conceivability instead of empiric proofs. 
Every known organism assumed to feel a mental state such as pain is 
characterised by a neural structure which shows many similarities across species from 
the point of view of its working ‘mechanics’ ruled by chemical and physical laws. 
Even if this argument does not imply that in the future a different form of organism 
(such as an alien) or an artificial device would be discovered able to realize any of the 
known mental states of living beings, it must be granted that such a system has not 
been found yet so that de facto there is no empirical evidence that can be used to the 
advantage of multiple realizability. 
A few years later, Shapiro wrote ‘Multiple Realizations’ (2000) which shares 
with Zangwill’s article a similar structure, but focuses on a different aspect of the 
theory. Incidentally, it is interesting to notice that whilst he was writing, Shapiro was 
not aware of anybody else’s attempt to question the truth of the multiple realizability 
theory7 (as he states in the premises of his article). A fact that testifies to the absolute 
rarity of these attempts of arguing against the general grounds of multiple 
realizability, until the beginning of the current decade. 
Shapiro’s main interest is in the substantial vagueness of one of the fundamental 
assumptions of the theory: he claims that, even among the supporters of the theory, 
there is little or no agreement concerning the conditions that must be satisfied in order 
to recognise without any doubt the presence of multiple realizations. The author states 
that nobody ever tried to establish any sort of condition, underestimating the whole 
problem of giving a definition about the circumstances to be satisfied. As a result, it is 
not possible to state clearly what kind of physical differences are necessary in order to 
conclude that two devices showing them and simultaneously realizing the same 
function can be properly said as displaying ‘distinct realizations’. 
 
7 Apart from Zangwill’s article, it appears that Shapiro was also unaware of Bechtel and 
Mundale’s “Multiple Realizability Revisited” which was published in 1999 (the next 




                                                
Before describing which conditions should be taken into account, Shapiro 
briefly analyses what he considers the main arguments in support of the theory, 
partially overlapping the categories already described by Zangwill. Firstly, the author 
gets rid of the argument grounded on the existence of functionally isomorphic 
systems: according to him, this is an a priori argument about physical relations 
because it follows directly from the definition of functional isomorphism. As a 
consequence, it cannot be used as empirical evidence as it is sometimes stated. What 
is more, the concept of functionally isomorphic devices cannot be used to support the 
hypothesis that these two devices are realizations of the same kind (which is the 
author’s way of referring to the two devices realising the same function). Shapiro is 
convinced that this mistaken identification between functional isomorphism and 
multiple realizability must be ascribed to the erroneous assumption that a system is 
identical to its ‘description of sequences of relations among functional states’ (Shapiro 
2000, p. 639). To underline this gross mistake, the author uses the analogy of a 
mousetrap and its description or representation on paper: according to the author, 
these two elements are functionally isomorphic because they preserve functional 
relation between the states, as required by Putnam’s definition of functional 
isomorphism. Despite their isomorphism, nobody would seriously consider the two 
systems as capable of performing the same function, accomplishing the same task or 
in any way performing distinct realizations of the same kind. 
As a second, Shapiro deals with the likelihood argument. As it has been 
described in the previous sections, in 1967 Putnam claimed that, if we assume any 
psychological state to be identical across species (hypothesis already challenged when 
Shapiro writes his article, as it will be shown in the next section), there is a high 
probability that this state is realized by systems which are characterised by substantial 
physical differences. However, as Putnam already stated and Shapiro underlines, it is 
still possible that parallel evolution converges on the same structures: thus, this 
argument cannot be used as the definitive reasoning against reductionism. After all, 
nature provides several examples of highly improbable events that happen anyway8. 
 
8 The most unlikely event I can imagine is represented by a casual combination of organic 
molecules generating an aggregate characterised by a helicoidal shape which starts 
replicating itself. Nonetheless this is what, approximately, happened around four billion 
years ago when the first forms of viruses started to populate our planet (of course I am not 




Since the main arguments fail to support concretely the existence of multiply 
realized kinds, it is necessary to establish rules that can be applied in all the necessary 
circumstances and that can be used to tell the difference between proper and illusive 
multiple realizations. According to the author, ‘To say that a kind is multiply 
realizable is to say that there are different ways to bring about the function that 
defines the kind’ (ibid., p. 644). These differences must affect directly those 
properties which have a causal relevance in generating the function under analysis: 
thus, firstly, it is necessary to establish which function is going to be analysed in the 
device and, secondly, among the features that characterise the device, it is necessary 
to understand which are the few ones that are causally relevant in relation to the 
selected function. 
According to this model, it is perfectly possible that two devices showing 
substantial physical differences may not exemplify yet multiple realizations of a 
function. The reason is quite simple: once the function has been established, we could 
change every physical feature that does not have a direct causal role in generating it 
and it would not matter. The example presented by Shapiro is centred on the mental 
experiment of replacing single neurons one by one with silicon-based chips: Zangwill 
would have categorised this example in the group of those committed to the problems 
related to the arguments from imagination, whilst Shapiro simply states that even if it 
were possible to realize these replacements, it could constitute a physical change 
which might have no causal relation with the main function of the brain (i.e. bringing 
forth the mind in Shapiro’s conception). The argument paradoxically implies that the 
only way to be sure that the mind is multiply realized is by studying the brain in the 
first place, in order to be sure of the causal physical relations that are responsible for 
the mind itself. As a consequence, the multiple realizability theory, which was 
supposed to deny the validity of reductionism in the study of the mind, becomes, at 
this stage of Shapiro’s modification of the theory, an important reason to push ahead a 
reductionist approach. 
There is still another consequence to be drawn from the rules identified by 
Shapiro: differing in those features that are causally relevant, the devices which 
realize the function effectively become of two different kinds. As a consequence, a 
valid multiple realization would be identified by means of a rule that never allows to 
verify it: on one hand, if the differences between the devices do not affect causally 




considered of the same kind, identical within the perspective of the function realised. 
On the other hand, if the differences affect causally relevant features, we are analysing 
two incomparable devices: if two devices have nothing in common but their functions, 
the only type of laws that can be drawn from their analysis is of the analytical kind. 
That is to say, such a condition simply allows to state ‘the capacity in virtue of which 
a functional kind is the kind that it is’ (Shapiro, 2000 p. 649): the author fairly adds 
that stating, for instance, that all different kinds of eyes can see, as you can draw from 
the very definition of what is analysed, does not constitute a significant knowledge 
improvement. 
Let us consider again the usual conclusive table: 
 
Absence of causally relevant differences:
A = M 
B = M 
A = B  
 
Presence of causally relevant differences: 
A = M1
B = M2
A ≠ B    and 
no relation (but analytical) can be established between M1 and M2  
 
The first case shows a perfect identity between the two elements in the equation: 
the systems (A and B) must be considered identical because, relatively to the function 
they are implementing, they do not differ in causally relevant features. The second 
table shows the opposite case: when the devices differ in their causal features 
relatively to the implementation of the analysed function, there cannot be established 
an empirical comparison between the two cases: the diversity among kinds in the first 
element of the identity makes every empirical statement impossible. 
This is called by Shapiro the multiple realizability dilemma”: if the author’s 
hypotheses are right, once it has been established a function, whether two devices 
differ in causal relevant features or not, the theory shows to be completely incoherent 
because of the theoretical impossibility to come out even with a mental experiment 
that could support it. 
Obviously, this reasoning has major consequences on the concept of the 
autonomy of the special sciences as Fodor formalised it. The focus must switch from 




                                                
mechanisms categorised as having a causal role in generating9 the function analysed. 
Using Shapiro’s example, “being able to see” is an analytical statement that allows to 
establish the category named “eyes” so that the functional kind have the role to fix the 
science domain, facilitating the empiric investigation of those physical laws which are 
causally relevant. 
In 2001 Rosenberg wrote ‘Comments and criticism on Multiple Realization and 
the special science’ which is the only critical assessment I am aware of, dealing with 
the problems arisen from Shapiro’s thesis. In his article, the author analyses Shapiro’s 
position about the plausibility of multiple realizability and the autonomy of the special 
sciences, drawing the attention essentially to two arguments. The first one appeals to 
the heterogeneous nature of the domains of special sciences: considering an 
evolutionary perspective, it is plausible to concede nature the ability to find more than 
one way to solve a problem. If compared to the similar argument already present in 
Putnam, Rosenberg’s position grounds the contingency of reductionist relation in the 
dynamic feature of evolving systems: the environment continuously challenges the 
organisms to fit new conditions and all organisms represent themselves an ever-
changing variable to one another. If we apply these rules to the special sciences 
domains, systems must compete against one another to fit their environment in a more 
rapid way if compared to the times needed by organisms to evolve in nature. As a 
consequence, the chances to have causally relevant changes in realizers of the same 
functional kinds are exponentially greater in number, making a reductionist 
perspective unlike to be effective if not in short periods of time. The law concerning 
the reduction becomes, in the author’s words, ‘historically bounded’ or ‘temporally 
true’ (Rosenberg 2001, p. 368). 
The second argument relies on the alternative Shapiro gives us concerning the 
autonomy of special sciences: according to Rosenberg, the first option consists in 
accepting that functional kinds have single realizations and, as a consequence, there 
can be no autonomy in special sciences (i.e. reductionist perspective). Otherwise, 
multiple realizability may be saved at the high price of denying the existence of laws 
(whether contingent or not) connecting functional kinds to their realizers and therefore 
special sciences are not empirical sciences (i.e. eliminativist perspective). 
 
9 In Shapiro’s conception of the multiple realizability theory, the mechanisms cannot be 
considered responsible of realizing the function as it was established in the precedent 




The problem is that, in Rosenberg’s analysis, multiple realizability is considered 
almost inevitable due to the way evolution works both in nature and in special science 
domains (chiefly referring to emotions, singular and collective behaviours). As a 
consequence, Shapiro’s reasoning leads to a model that is committed to the 
eliminativist perspective and the attempt to save the existence of special sciences 
assigning them a taxonomic rule generating classes seems to confirm this way to 
interpret the given alternative: ‘once their [of the special sciences] usefulness in 
taxonomizing explananda has been exhausted, they have no further function’ 
(Rosenberg 2001, p. 373). 
Shapiro clearly did try to avoid such a conclusion, and Rosenberg himself 
considers it highly unreasonable: the problem both the authors are well aware of 
consists in the fact that, once such a position has been embraced, it is unclear how, in 
the past decades, it has been possible that the models arisen within special sciences 
could show the explanatory powerfulness everybody tributes them. 
 
 
5. Towards the supervenience of neuroscience. The main dispute the 
theory is facing at present is fought in the field of neuroscience: new empirical 
evidences and models of mind arise from this field and they can hardly be shown to 
be compatible with the theory here discussed. 
A strong use of neuroscience findings against the conceivability of the multiple 
realizations of mental states has been recently attempted in Bechtel and Mundale’s 
‘Multiple realizability revisited’ (1999). The previous section has presented the first 
switch of attention in the analysis of the theory: rather than considering the classical 
analysis of the theoretical implications that can be derived from Putnam’s hypothesis 
that functional kinds are multiply realized over physical kinds (i.e. Fodor’s and J. 
Kim’s choice), Zangwill and Shapiro have focused their arguments firstly on the 
conditions that must be considered necessary in order to verify the presence of 
multiple realizations and, secondly, on the role the functional states play in the 
relation established between them and the physical kinds. 
Bechtel and Mundale represent a further change in the strategies of analysis of 
the theory showing a perspective which is reversed if compared to the last one: the 
authors focus their analysis on the physical part of the relation and, coherently, on the 




objective is made explicit in the article: they want to deny the validity of the 
antireductionist conclusions implied by Fodor’s generalised version of the theory 
presenting mainly two arguments. 
First, they claim that it is undeniable that in the last decades a huge amount of 
information has been being acquired about brain structures of species other than 
human and their correlated psychological predicates. Even though this correlation 
does not support the old identity theory, these findings are consistently affecting the 
understanding of human structures and the related mental processes: it cannot be 
ignored that this fruitful path of research would have not been even opened, if the 
generalised version of the theory –and its hypothesised contingency in the relation 
between physical and functional kinds– had been taken for granted. 
Secondly, it is supported the idea that the notion of a physical or chemical brain 
state is, quoting the authors’ words, ‘philosopher’s fiction’ (Bechtel and Mundale 
1999, p. 177). According to the authors, such a problem with the reference to one of 
the two elements in the relation analysed so far, takes the main responsibility for the 
practical fallacies of both the identity theory and the multiple realizability theory. 
Concerning the first of the two points, this empirical way to support the 
hypothesis for cross-species neural structures is known to be a weak defence of 
reductionism: findings which support across-species neural correlates for specific 
mental states would not prove that in the future a different form of device or organism 
might show to be able to implement one of those mental states thanks to a different 
structure. In a few words, even an endless series of proofs in favour of the across 
species neural identity would not make the identity necessary and would not establish 
a law-like relation between the two elements considered. Nevertheless, it must be 
reminded that the majority of the arguments in favour of multiple realizations do not 
rely on a rare chance to find two different physical kinds realizing the same mental 
state: they assert firmly the overwhelmingly high probability to find in nature several 
physical devices able to perform such realizations. As a matter of fact, Fodor’s 
reasoning brings forth the idea that examples of such kind have already been found. 
Nevertheless, neuroscience has changed dramatically since Fodor wrote about 
neural plasticity appealing to the physiological psychologist Karl Lashley: the 
hypothesis of multiple realizations over times has been grounded on a vision of the 
brain which has been meanwhile abandoned by science. Bechtel and Mundale draw in 




                                                
reconstructing in particular the development of the researches oriented on the 
generation of neuroanatomical maps that could assign mental functions to specific 
regions, especially considering the cortex. Lashley’s criticisms to these studies, which 
were centred both on specific human cortex regions and across species structures, 
were grounded on the many ambiguities that characterised at that time the 
identification of these regions. In the attempt to criticise Korbinian Brodmann’s 
hypothesis of functionally “static” cortex, Lashley and George Clark took two spider 
monkeys (ateles geoffroyi) and, using the same techniques, they reached two 
significantly different neuroanatomical maps of the cortex of the two apes. 
In spite of the results of experiments like the one just described, whose attempt 
was to show the inconsistency of such hypothesis, the studies for a more accurate map 
of the human cortex went on, reaching controversial but useful results. However, the 
key moment for these researches has been reached in 1990 10  thanks to the 
introduction of a new tool of investigation: the functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) which was added to other new techniques of tomography. The fMRI is a non 
invasive technique which is becoming as more important as more the improving 
technology allows fast and highly defined images: its main contribution is still today 
in the fact that fMRI is the only tool that allows the analysis and the record of the 
activation state of groups of neurons in human patients awake and aware. Combining 
these new tools of imaging with posttraumatic studies, the cortex has been recently 
divided into nearly fifty functional areas, each showing an even further division into a 
high number of cortical sub-regions. 
It is undeniable that there are many ambiguities in the results coming from these 
studies: first, it is not easy to find a task that may result in the activation of a single 
area. Secondly, should such a task be found, it is highly unrealistic to consider a 
human being as capable of focusing all his or her attentive resources on this very 
single task, becoming suddenly oblivious of everything that does not concern it. 
Third, but most important, the controversy about the existence of species specific 
 
10 The first experiments that used magnetic resonance for the purpose to discover functional 
regions in central nervous systems have been described in: S. Ogawa, at al. 1990: 
"Oxygenation Sensitive Contrast in Magnetic Resonance Image of Rodent Brain at High 
Magnetic Fields", Magnetic Resonance in Medicine 14: 68-78. Thanks to the functional 
magnetic resonance, it is possible today to avoid the use of invasive electrodes and 
researchers are now able to study what “happens” (what regions are “active”) in healthy 





neural differences has been fed by these new findings and ways of investigations: 
neuroanatomical maps show unique features (only valid in the subject analysed) as 
well as the ones that can be applied to a wide variety of species (some regions of the 
cortex) and others that can even be generally applied across species (some neural 
structures in proto-brains share their functions with superior mammal neural systems). 
Above all, the already known phenomena of plasticity and degeneracy within a single 
subject have been widely confirmed by fMRI. It seems clear now that these 
differences may not be ascribed to the vagueness of experiments or the mistaken 
offsetting of background noise. 
According to Bechtel and Mundale’s reasoning, these phenomena can be easily 
explained appealing to the very definition problem that constitutes the original ground 
of that “philosopher’s fiction” already cited, that is to say the erroneous idea that there 
is a scientific use of terms such as physical or chemical brain state. It is acknowledged 
by the authors that the closest neuroscientist concept refers neither to a specific 
activation of single neurons nor to the transmission of single or multiple impulses 
through synapses or nerves. Neuroscience is in fact familiar with the different idea of 
a “neural activity”, which refers to all the variations in energy use that characterise the 
passing from a generic rest status to an energy consuming activity that can be located 
in a certain region or area of the brain. 
Consequently, the authors point out that this philosopher’s fiction misled in 
generating the series of interpretative fallacies so far described by means of the 
different “grain of analysis” that has been consequently assumed by the communities 
of philosophers and neuroscientists. In other words, the supposed existence of a 
psychological state such as hunger in octopuses and human beings (the authors have 
chosen intentionally an example already used by Putnam in his 1967 article) can be 
only considered correct if we associate it with a general feature, as it would happen 
with a vaguely described behaviour. If we accept that “hunger” is the “food-seeking” 
behaviour, then we are adopting a coarse grain in the psychological analysis and it 
seems just fair to use the same kind of rough analysis in relation to the neural 
structure responsible for the behaviour. Given this exceptionally coarse grain of 
analysis, the neuroscientists may conclude that there is a neural activity in a part of 
the neural system of the octopus, which is not incompatible with a correspondent 




                                                
the behaviours they generate in the two organisms, the simple existence of a neural 
activity is itself enough to be accepted as a similarity. 
For the same reason, if we prefer a fine grain method in the analysis of the 
precise neural structure responsible for the psychological state of hunger in octopuses 
and human beings, then it becomes clear that the two systems are completely 
different, but at the same time, they are also realizing two mental states which are at 
least as different as their neural correlates. It should be conceded that, even if we only 
consider the external behaviour linked with the psychological state of hunger, a food-
seeking octopus does show neither the same sequence of actions, nor the same 
singular behaviours of a food-seeking human. The inference allowed is that, in this 
new and well-detailed context, the two systems are not realizing the same token-
mental state and it is extremely hard to believe that these two mental states may even 
belong to the same type. 
According to the authors, the fallacies have been then created by the attempt to 
match a coarse grain analysis for functional kinds, generating a class of generic states 
such as hunger, with an extremely fine grain analysis for physical kinds. Furthermore, 
this latter kind of analysis is so extremely fine, that it ended in the creation of a kind 
that cannot be considered but ‘fictional’, since it is not used in any of the sciences 
involved in these investigations: this is precisely the case of the activation of single 
cells or the identification of single impulses firing through specific synapses. 
In his article ‘Discussion: a defense of Bechtel and Mundale’, Couch (2004) 
fairly points out that the argument for multiple realizations always requires both a 
difference in the physical states and, symmetrically, a coincidence in the 
psychological predicates. Bechtel and Mundale’s appeal to the different grain of 
analysis makes the argument fall either in the first step (in the “coarse” case) or in the 
second one (in the “fine” one): it seems virtually impossible to verify it under any 
circumstances. 
This new reductionist position is summarized in the following table11: 
 
 
11 I am using the symbol “≈” (approximately equal) to stress the difference with the identities 
in the precedent tables. In place of the identity between mental states and “C-nerve fibres 
activation” or firing neurons, there is now a correlation with the neural activity in a region. 
The area involved may be identified with good approximation but still it cannot be 
established a theoretical identity involving each single neuron which is part of the cortical 




Fine grain case: 
A ≈ M1
B ≈ M2
A ≠ B and M1 ≠ M2
 
Coarse grain case: 
A ≈ M1
B ≈ M2
A ≈ B and M1 ≈ M2  
 
The same reasoning may be used to give an account of the differences noticed in 
neuroanatomical mapping of cortices. It is not simply a way to stress similarities 
where others have observed differences: the main effort made by the two authors is 
directed towards a philosophical appraisal of the findings coming from neuroscience. 
The identification of brain areas based on their activity during a correspondent 
behaviour (or supposed inner psychological state) does allow looking for homologies 
within different brain structures and, as a matter of fact, it enables successful 
generalizations across species. 
An interesting objection has been arisen in the article ‘Testing Multiple 
Realizability: a Discussion of Bechtel and Mundale’ by Sungsu Kim (2002). Even 
though he considers the thesis for multiple realizability not proven, the author focuses 
his attention to the necessary distinction between evolutionary concepts of homology 
and homoplasy; a distinction that he claims being perfectly appropriate for brain 
structures. On one hand, every similarity in the structure of different species which is 
based on their descent from a common ancestor defines an homology: a commonly 
used example shows the connection between bird wings and human arms which are 
characterised by the same structure (if we use the perspective of their bones 
structures) even if of course their use is now completely different. On the other hand, 
homoplasy is defined as a correspondence between structures or organs (or parts of 
organs) acquired as the result of parallel evolution: in this case, the typical 
philosophers’ example is represented by the structure of camera eyes in humans and 
octopi. 
In his article, S. Kim claims the homologies in the brain to be unsuitable 
evidence both against and in favour of multiple realizability theory. On the contrary, 
homoplasies associated with similar functions performed by two or more species, may 




by different structures: for instance, bat wings show a completely different structure 
when compared to bird wings, despite the fact that they are associated to the same 
function –to fly–. If we consider these circumstances, the absence of homoplasy 
becomes a proof in favour of multiple realizations of the specified function, since it is 
de facto realized by different structures. 
In conclusion, S. Kim suggests that the homoplasies may be used as the litmus 
paper of multiple realizations: on one hand, positive examples are the essential proofs 
against multiple realizability; on the other hand, negative examples are necessary in 
supporting the theory. S. Kim’s remarks are then addressed against Bechtel and 
Mundale’s researches: which he sees focused only on homologies across species 
which will not prove anything concerning the theory. The reason has already been 
mentioned at the beginning of this section and relies on the fact that even if the 
convergence of identical brain structure would be proven in any circumstances, this 
would still be a weak argument against multiple realizability allowing in a hypothetic 
future the discovery of a psychological predicate characteristic of a living being, 
realized by silicon-based devices or by other life forms (the “usual” aliens from other 
planets) not based on neural systems. 
In his article, Couch (2004) replied to the objections raised by S. Kim: the 
author concedes that there would not be any informative content in a study that only 
focused on homologies, when these are realizing similar functions. Nonetheless, 
Fodor’s generalised hypothesis is centred on the ability of a single structure to 
perform different tasks in different periods. Thus, even if there is certainly a 
difference in the study of a single structure and the study of how these structures 
evolved within brains across species, this research performed by neuroscientists and 
used as an argument by Bechtel and Mundale is still useful in order to belittle the 
likelihood of generalised theorists’ predictions as characterised at least by great 
imprudence. 
Aside from all the considerations about homologies and homoplasies, it seems 
fair to concede that neuroscience has proved so far to be fruitful for the studies of the 
mind, so that Bechtel and Mundale’s questions in relation to Fodor’s generalised 
theory deserve to be taken into account. In particular, the authors’ concern is that the 
assumption of the predominance of virtual machine studies over studies centred on 
neural systems is blind in respect of those empirical findings that have been 




implicitly denying the contingency in the relation between mental and physical. From 
a pragmatic point of view, Fodor’s generalization proves to be poor and to constitute 
an obstacle to future achievements. 
Finally, the two authors devotes little attention to the hypothesis of the 
development of a device able to realize psychological states but made out of 
components that do not share anything in common with the living organisms. In this 
case, if such a system were built, even the appeal to the coarse grain type of analysis 
would not save from conceding the existence of a proper multiple realization of 
mental states. The authors do not to consider this hypothesis likely to happen even in 
a remote future: they claim that such a result would probably be obtained with 
artificial machines far different from the present serial ones. Moreover, in spite of 
everything claimed by proponents of multiple realizability, there are widely accepted 
cases in physics and chemistry in which a particular set of properties is only realised 
by a single entity (the authors use the example of water functional properties, which 
can only be realized by the molecule H2O): the psychological state may be one of 
these. 
The authors’ conclusions concerning the functionalist approach in general may 
come as a surprise. They state explicitly that their reasoning does not directly affect 
functionalist assumptions in toto: their challenge to multiple realizability does not 
undercut functionalism because the functional characterization of the mental states is 
still important in order to fix the identification of those kinds that neuroscience later 
attributes to brain regions. 
 
Moreover, as we have emphasized, it is the functional characterization 
(the contribution to behaviour) that guides the identification of brain areas. 
A thoroughgoing functionalism uses functional criteria to identify both 
psychological states and brain states and can survive even if we jettison 
the multiple realizability theory. (Bechtel and Mundale 1999, p. 204-205) 
 
This conclusion is interestingly close to the one Shapiro will support a year later 
in the article already analysed in the precedent section, but it seems to me that the 
whole problem has been voluntarily ignored in order to downplay its importance. I 




coherently assume a completely different position in relation to the supervenience of 
the role of functions in brain mapping researches. 
All things considered, it still seems that, methodologically and theoretically, the 
multiple realizability theory is not as “overwhelmingly likely” as it has been assumed 






6. Parallel processes: from functional states to m-functions. In my 
opinion, two problems have affected the multiple realizability theory during its whole 
evolution and both of them seem to have a major influence on the arguments and the 
reasoning used by both the supporters of the theory and those who try to demonstrate 
its fallacies. I define these two problems as follows: 
1. The identification of the mind with the probabilistic automata is structurally 
inadequate to give a computational description of processes performed by parallel 
distributed systems. 
2. The abstract use of the term “function”, which characterises the generalised 
theory, leads to partial description of mental processes, depriving the theory of its 
efficacy and descriptive power. 
These problems share the same origin and can be easily considered the two sides 
of the same coin: one of the main issues that contributed to their generation is 
represented by a slight change in the reference and in the concept of the Universal 
Turing Machine when these systems started to be used in the field of philosophy of 
mind. The definition of such virtual machines, which are pivotal for all the different 
versions of the multiple realizability theory and in general for the functionalist model 
of mind, was originally fixed by Turing’s theory of computability. The problem is 
that, when contemporary philosophers deal with Universal Turing Machines, they are 
actually giving life to a different type of system characterised by different 
computational features. These features are usually implicit, lacking the mathematical 
definition that is typical of the proper Turing Machines, and this is the main reason 
why they are rarely being questioned. 
To put it simple, from a computational point of view, the identification between 
the computation performed by a neural system and a Turing Machine (or a 
probabilistic automaton) is widely overestimated and, in addition, it is usually 
erroneously attributed to Turing himself. A list of misconceptions about Turing’s 
famous article “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the 
Entscheidungsproblem” (1936) is well described by Copeland’s entry in the Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy “The Church-Turing Thesis” (2002). In brief, Copeland 




mathematically demonstrated how a Universal Turing machine can compute any 
function performed by any other machine with any architecture, given sufficient time 
and memory.  
The fallacy that relies on this sentence can only be explained after giving an 
account of how two specific words are used within the computability theory entailing 
a reference different from the one usually attributed. 
First, another good way to describe this false hypothesis is “a Universal Turing 
machine can compute any set of instructions [etc.]”. Thus, the term “function” is used 
in this context as a synonym with “set of instructions” or “program” of a virtual 
machine. In the first chapter it has already been pointed out how several authors 
dealing with the problem of multiple realizations have different ways to use the term 
function. Its reference varies from the functional states in a virtual machine, to 
psychological states in a living being or to the tasks accomplished by an artificial 
device, but in none of these circumstances it has been used in place of the description 
of the state transitions, as it is used here. Yet, from a mathematical perspective, a 
function is a relation or an expression involving one or more variables: this is the 
reference that the term has when it is applied to the field of computation. As a 
consequence, a function computed by a Turing machine corresponds to its set of 
instructions rather than to one of its functional states because it describes the way 
information is processed by the system. Finally, considering the input of the machine, 
which is the information to be processed or –in a mathematical perspective– the 
domain of the variables computed, we can conclude that the functional state consists 
in a value assigned by the machine to a specific moment in its process, in relation to 
the assignation of values to the variables. 
Since the analysed systems are virtual machine, a schematic result may be 
represented as follows: 
{ x1, x2, x3, ... xn }→ A → B → C → D →  ... → (final status) 
The input assigns a value to each of the n variables { x1, x2, x3, ... xn }, then the 
virtual machine computes these values as it is described by its set of instructions, 
reaching its first status (A). The new status gives life to a new series of processes that 
allow the machine to change again status in favour of the second one (B): the 
operation is replicated till the virtual machine reaches the final status described by the 




Questioning if the function computed by a system may coincide, under certain 
circumstances, with the function (i.e. the task) accomplished by the system itself, is a 
misconception of the terms used. Thus it is important to stress that the way the term 
function is used in the field of philosophy of mind differs substantially from its use in 
the field of mathematics (and consequently in the field of the computational theory). 
Thus, in order to avoid the misunderstandings that may be caused by this double 
reference, I will use the words “mathematical-function” (or m-function) to refer to the 
set of mathematical expressions that establishes the rules a system uses to process the 
information. 
Finally, if we were only discussing processes in virtual machines, it would be 
possible to consider the use of the expression “set of instructions” or the term 
“program” in place of “m-function”, since the first two have already been introduced 
in the first section of this dissertation. But the purpose of this reasoning is to 
demonstrate how some particular systems can process information in a way that is not 
computable by the virtual systems described by Turing: my proposal is then to use the 
m-functions to refer to the entire class of the hypothetic processes to whom it is 
possible to give a mathematical description. The use of a new expression becomes 
necessary because the precedent cited alternatives are conceptually bound with Turing 
machines and therefore they would mislead again into the problem that gave origin of 
this argument. That is to say, the fallacious belief of the identification of the class of 
processes which have a mathematical description, with the class of processes that can 
be calculated by Universal Turing machines. 
As a matter of fact, it must be acknowledged that there are m-functions that 
cannot be computed by Universal Turing machines, even if they can still be computed 
by other systems.  
What Turing did demonstrate is that a properly instructed Universal Turing 
machine can realize any m-function that can be computed by any Turing machine, but 
these m-functions must be characterised by a ‘mechanical method’ (simply M in 
Copeland’s article) that must meet the following requirements: 
 
1) M is set out in terms of a finite number of exact instructions (each 
instruction being expressed by means of a finite number of symbols); 2) M 




                                                
number of steps; 3) M can (in practice or in principle) be carried out by a 
human being unaided by any machinery save paper and pencil; 4) M 
demands no insight or ingenuity on the part of the human being carrying it 
out. (Copeland 2002, first section in the web-page). 
 
It may seem that the range of the m-functions computable by these virtual 
devices still remains vast; nonetheless, these four rules set a series of important 
restrictions, making the types of realizable m-functions decrease in number, especially 
if we compare this new range of possibilities with the order of infinite that 
characterised the first assumption about the omnipotence of the Universal Turing 
machine. 
Therefore, it is clearly stated (requirements 1 and 2) that Turing machines are 
characterised by finiteness: finite number of steps for finite number of instructions 
(independently of the variable assignation) which are themselves defined by a finite 
number of symbols. As far as the other two requirements are concerned, these may be 
difficult to interpret in the proper way: Copeland exemplifies the idea appealing to the 
use of the truth table test for tautologies. The test must be conceived as applied to 
every m-function just in principle, despite the fact that it is easy to imagine why, in 
practice, there are not enough pencils and papers in the world to work out some 
complex m-functions which are computable by Turing machines. 
At any rate, for the purpose of this dissertation, it should be sufficient to point 
out that the set of hypothetic m-functions realized by any Turing machine is 
countable, that is to say, it is characterised by the same order of infinite of the 
integers. Since the number of all the hypothetic computable m-functions is of a higher 
order of magnitude, it is said that it is uncountable1: hence, there is an infinite number 
of m-functions that cannot be realized by a Turing machine and therefore cannot be 
considered Turing-computable. 
If the first cause of misunderstanding about the notion of computability relies on 
the use of the term function, the second one has been clearly pictured by Copeland as 
 
1 In mathematics it is possible to distinguish between orders of infinite: two sets composed by 
infinite elements can be compared and it can be established if one of the two is of a higher 
order, that is to say, it includes more elements than the other even if both of them count 
infinite ones. A simple example is given by the numbers: even though they are infinite, 
integers are clearly less (i.e. minor order) than real numbers. The latter class, in fact, 




generated by a false understanding of the statement that Turing machines can compute 
any computable m-function. This statement can only be considered true if we use 
properly the definition of “computable” given in the Church-Turing thesis: in brief, 
the thesis defines every m-function characterised by a mechanical method as 
effectively calculable and, as a consequence, computable. Clearly it is due to this 
definition of computability if the set of m-functions effectively computed by Turing 
machines coincide with the set of all computable functions. As Copeland underlines, 
the problems start when this notion of non-computability by Turing machines is 
confused with the one of the absence of a mathematical description. 
This is the reason why I consider the use of the term “computability” in the way 
it is described by the Church-Turing thesis as easily misleading into the overlap of the 
set of computable functions with the decisively vaster set of mathematical functions. 
It has already been stated that the same Church-Turing thesis also allows the existence 
of mathematical functions which are not characterised by a mechanical method and 
consequently are not computable by a Turing machine, even though they can be 
computed by other systems using different forms of processes. As a consequence, I do 
not see a good reason to keep on using the Turing machine perspective in order to 
establish whether an m-function is (properly) computable or not, since it is clear that 
the same thesis allows the possibility for (properly) incomputable m-functions to be 
computable, once the perspective of a differently structured system is used. 
Once again, in order to avoid future misunderstandings in this dissertation, I will 
always refer to the “Turing-computability”, in place of the standard (and deceptive in 
my opinion) “computability” defined in the Church-Turing thesis. It must be borne in 
mind that this change in words does not change the mathematical reference: both 
expressions refer to the very set of m-functions. 
In conclusion, the newly established class of m-functions is composed of those 
which are Turing-computable plus those which are “differently structured system”-
computable. Incidentally, it is important to avoid another erroneous deduction which 
may be drawn by the absence of the explanatory power of a Turing machine for the 
latter type of m-functions. As it has been stated concerning the m-functions that these 
systems implement, processes performed by non-Turing systems are mathematically 
describable: every process implemented by a system has its own complete description 




                                                
Before establishing whether or not the relation between neural systems and the 
mental is contingent, it appears now that, if we want to be adherent to Putnam’s early 
formulation, there is a fundamental requirement to consider in order to have the 
chance to use properly a virtual machine as a description or simulation of what is 
implemented by the neural matter. Actually, if it were possible to show that the m-
functions implemented by neural systems fail to meet at least one of the requirements 
that are necessary for the simulation with a virtual machine, then it could be 
concluded that this path leads to a dead end. Namely, it would be sufficient to show 
that the processes realized by these systems are not characterised by finiteness to have 
m-functions which are not characterised by the feature of being Turing-computable. 
Even assuming a functionalist approach, I think this reasoning might be sufficient to 
come to the conclusion that it is necessary to study the way parallel systems process 
their data, in order to set out a falsification path towards the hypothesis that relies on 
the famous identification of the mind with the virtual machine. What conclusion such 
a path would lead to cannot be established a priori. 
It may be argued that even if we could find out that parallel systems do not 
realize Turing-computable m-functions, this finding by itself would not be enough to 
discard multiple realizability. A new hypothetical and more powerful virtual machine 
might be conceived: different from the known Turing machines, it might widen the 
range of computable functions realizable by virtual machines, overcoming some of, if 
not all, the weak points of the classic machines. 
Nonetheless, it seems that a similar powerful virtual machine is unlikely to 
come and it is usually considered mathematically implausible2. But even if it were 
plausible, this objection would not lead far from a reductionist perspective: these new 
hypothetic systems should not simulate a generic new set of m-functions but those 
specific of the parallel distributed systems3 so that once again, in order to be sure that 
 
2 The existence and the features of devices that may result to be able to implement such 
Turing-incomputable m-functions have been debated at least for five decades. An essential 
bibliography and a brief account of this debate can be found in section 2 of Copeland’s 
entry in the Stanford Encyclopaedia (see references for details). As a matter of fact the 
probabilistic automata represent a virtual machine able to realize a wider set of m-functions, 
if compared to the Turing machines. In this chapter I will refer only to Turing machine for 
the convenience of the reasoning, but the criticism can be applied to the probabilistic 
automata as well (the set of m-functions realized is still countable and the m-functions 
themselves are characterised by the same features). 
3 In literature it is usually necessary to distinguish parallel systems characterised by local 




                                                                                                                                           
the proper set of m-functions is part of the domain of these new machines, it would be 
necessary to know first what type of m-functions are implemented by parallel 
systems. Furthermore, such new devices would also have to be characterised by one 
of the essential features in the Universal Turing machines which are reprogrammable: 
input data can change the m-functions implemented (within the set of the Turing-
computable m-functions) giving a good explanation of the process of learning from 
environment in living beings. The new hypothetic virtual machine must share this 
feature with the Universal Turing machines or it will be forced to simulate a fixed set 
of m-functions. 
My claim is that, whether or not such new machines are necessary (and, 
consequently, whether or not the early hypothesis of multiple realizability is still 
plausible) can only be established after understanding what sort of m-functions are 
realised by neural networks. Thus, it is necessary to cope with the specific features 
that characterise a parallel distributed system and, taken for granted the definition of 
probabilistic automata, it is widely recognised that parallel distributed systems differ 
from the former serial machines concerning4: 
1) Time and energy requirements.  
2) Memory operation (storing and recalling information). 
3) Input information encoding.  
4) Autonomous development of categories. 
5) Reaction to unknown stimulation (confabulation). 
6) Robustness (ability to resist to physical damage). 
7) Degeneracy (ability of structurally different elements of a system to perform the 
same function or yield the same output). 
Biological systems based on neural structures require specific amount of time 
and energies in order to activate their systems. A lack of the latter may modify 
substantially the computational processes performed (affecting the neural processes in 
 
this dissertation it is not necessary to investigate the former systems since the latter are 
closer to biological neural networks. This reasoning aims at showing what kind of 
computations are implemented by natural systems, in order to falsify the assumption that 
these m-functions can be realised by anything else but parallel distributed neural systems; 
as a consequence, unless specified differently in the text, every time I refer to parallel 
systems, I will then refer to parallel distributed structures. 
4  I give here a brief account of the main distinctive features that characterize parallel 
distributed systems: my first source in this task is supplied by the two volumes “Parallel 
Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition” (1986) by 




the nodes of the network) by the system independently of both the awareness and the 
perception of such a lack by the organism: in other words, the m-functions 
implemented may change independently of the input data, in consequence of a 
difference in the amount of the available resources. Figuratively, the system can be 
reprogrammed by inside mechanisms as well as by outside information. 
Concerning time requirements, if the processes are suddenly interrupted due to a 
lack of time, these systems are still able to give an output even if it will probably 
differ from the one the system would have reached having the correct amount of time. 
Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that, once the device has started processing its input 
information, there is no datum that may result in a system failure (i.e. in a situation 
characterised by no output) because the output units of the system always show a 
pattern corresponding to a vector during the whole data processing. For the same 
reason physical damages of the network, or any other action that results in altering the 
normal execution of the processes described by the m-functions, will not result in 
system failures even if they will probably affect the output vector of the system. 
The way information is stored and recalled is another fundamental feature that 
distinguishes the m-functions implemented by these systems from those implemented 
by serial machines. It is known that biological neural systems are able to distribute 
information between several units of the network at the same time. When information 
is stored, it does not become a copy of the original set of stimulations: it is rather 
modified depending on the precedent information stored. Similarly, when information 
is recalled, it may be modified again or it can be only partially recalled (e.g. few 
distinctive features of a complex set of stimuli). 
In order to clarify these particular features, it is probably useful to give an 
example: a few months ago I was asked to design a neural architecture that could 
check the correctness of a string of symbols, given a simple grammar and a 
vocabulary only composed of two symbols (for the purpose of the argument, let us say 
“1” and “2”). The grammar consisted in a single rule which stated that the device had 
to accept strings composed of no more than a single unit of the second symbol and 
any number of the first symbol: the symbol dispositions had to be considered 
irrelevant and, finally, any other string had to be rejected as incorrect. 
In other words, the devices I am going to present here have to be able to analyse 




by means of an association to an output for acceptable strings and a different output 
for unacceptable ones. For instance: 
 





There is no established limit to the number of symbols per string, and as a 
consequence the parallel system cannot rely on local representations. In other words, a 
neural system checking every single position of each string with a different receptor 
cannot be used: there is no alternative to a distributed system. 
 
 
The three networks here drawn represent the scheme of three parallel systems 
able to accomplish the given task: in particular, the first scheme represents the 
simplest possible network able to solve this particular function, whilst the others show 
just two of the infinite possible variants of the first structure. Other architectures, 
characterised by a different conception and a more complex structure may be easily 
conceived: for the purpose of this reasoning, these three little networks exemplify the 
fact that infinite parallel structures may accomplish this specific task. 
Thus, the first network is characterised by a single receptor X1 (the circle with 




                                                
(the circles characterised by a number inside) and four links or synapses5. Since the 
device is asked to process a virtually endless string, I decided that the single receptor 
will process a single position in the string per segment of time (e.g. the first example 
given in the table, 12112, is decomposed in five inputs, the first signal is 1, the second 
is 2,  then the third and the fourth is 1 again and finally 2 to close the string).  
When the first symbol reaches the receptor, it is encoded as a number and then it 
is propagated unaltered through the synapses till it reaches the two computational 
units (the neurons) where it is processed separately. The neurons compute the signals 
and react in a way that is determined by the specific mathematical function that 
characterises each of them: one of the main features of these m-functions in the 
examples here proposed is represented by the threshold of the neuron. In order to 
simplify the argument, I here assume that these computational functions are always 
constituted by simple inequalities: as a consequence, if the signals reaching a neuron 
overcome its threshold (the value is expressed by the number pictured in the circles 
that represent the neurons), the neuron becomes “active” and it propagates a single 
signal (value=1) to all the outgoing links. Finally, when the neuron marked as Ω1 is 
activated, the device classifies the analysed string as incorrect. 
Concerning the structure, there is a final remark about the links in the neural 
network: it is necessary to underline that these connectionist devices usually show 
weights associated to these links, that is to say, a value is assigned to each of them and 
it strengthens or weakens the propagated signals. Once again, in order to simplify the 
description, these weights are all assumed to be equal to 1 (i.e. the signals are always 
propagated unaltered). 
Let us consider again the first string in the given table (12112): the first position 
input is propagated by the receptor, it reaches the neurons, but it does not activate any 
of them. On the contrary, the second input unit activates the neuron Ω2 which 
propagates the signal towards itself (by means of the red circuit) and the other neuron 
Ω1. The third and the fourth inputs in the string do not change the conditions of the 
activation of the system: the second neuron is still active due to the signals coming 
from both the circuit and the receptor whilst the first neuron is still deactivated. 
 





Finally, the fifth position of the string shows again the symbol “2”: if compared 
with the first time this symbol has occurred in the string (i.e. the second position), 
now the neuron Ω2 is already activated so that the neuron Ω1 receives the signals 
coming from both the string and the network (black arrow-link propagates the signal 
coming from the activation of Ω2 to Ω1). As a consequence, even if the external 
stimulus is not different from the one already received in the past, this time Ω1 is 
activated, giving the correct output that classifies the string as “not acceptable”. 
The m-functions realized by this system consist of two sets of inequalities: 
 
t0 t1  t0 t1
Ω2 = 0 → x < 2 
Ω1 = 0 
Ω2 = 0 
   
     
 2 ≤ x < 3 
Ω1 = 0 
Ω2 = 1 
 Ω2 = 1 → x < 1 
Ω1 = 0 
Ω2 = 0 
     
 x ≥ 3 
Ω1 = 1 
Ω2 = 1 
  1 ≤ x < 2 
Ω1 = 0 
Ω2 = 1 
     
    x ≥ 2 
Ω1 = 1 
Ω2 = 1 
 
The table shows the two sets of inequalities in the columns t1: the series of 
symbols (Ω2 = 0/1 →) stands for “the deactivation/activation of neuron Ω2 in the time 
t0 implies the set of inequalities in the time t1”. 
It is important to notice that the circuit (the red arrow link) in the architecture 
allows the input information to change the set of m-functions realized by the device 
(i.e. the way it reacts to its input). The signal propagated through the circuit keeps the 
neuron Ω2 activated as long as the value assigned to the variable x (the input) 
overcomes or it is equal to 1; at the same time, the signal propagated by this neuron 
has the effect to change the “disposition” of the neuron Ω1 to be activated by an 
external stimulus. Consequently, it would not be a mistake to claim that this single 
link grants the system a memory-like mechanism, allowing it to recognise the symbol 




                                                
The three neural networks previously drawn have been claimed to accomplish 
the same task: it is time then to show if it is possible that they are multiply realizing 
the same m-functions (i.e. the parallel system equivalent to the set of instructions in 
serial systems) or, what is more important as far as this dissertation is concerned, the 
same functional state (i.e. their equivalent to parallel systems, which are still to be 
defined). 
The second neural network shows a single difference if compared with the first 
one: the architecture has been changed. The number of receptors has been increased 
of a single unit and, consequently, there are also two more synapses that link the new 
receptor to both the neurons. Such a difference implies that the input is now composed 
of a two-dimensional vector, that is to say, the “world” this new device has access to 
is composed of couples of numbers, instead of single numbers. 
An input that may count on a vector with two dimensions allows a wide variety 
of encoding solutions to the problem of feeding the system with the usual string of 
two symbols6. Each of these solutions leads to different assignations of the other 
variables in the same set of m-functions, in order to make the system able to 
accomplish the given task (reaching the objective of classifying the strings). However 
even if every possible variable is kept constant, the main difference in encoding the 
signal (i.e. the vector dimension) has already affected significantly the m-functions 
implemented by the system, making them completely different from the ones 
presented to describe the first neural network. 
As a matter of fact, in the given example, the network still sticks to the rule to 
use simplified versions of these parallel systems –fixed synapses weights (which 
propagate unaltered signals), thresholds (the same displayed in the first device) and 
computational functions in neurons (again simple inequalities)– but every alteration in 
its architecture results in realizing m-functions belonging to different sets. 
Furthermore, some of these structural changes make the m-functions so different that 
they can no longer be compared with one another: this is the case of a change in the 
number of receptors as in the example here analysed. 
 
6 For instance, the first easiest choice might be to mirror the encoding system already used for 
the first device, limiting the duty to propagate all the input signals to one of the two 
receptors. Another possibility would be to make one of the two receptors react to both 
symbols whilst the other one only reacts to the second. One more hypothesis would be to 
dedicate each receptor to only one of the two symbols in the vocabulary so that they are 




The reason why the m-functions that describe the processes in the second 
network cannot be compared with those implemented by the first network relies on 
the impossibility to compare two vectors with two different dimensions or (which is 
the same in this case) two m-functions relying on a different number of variables. 
Namely, the vector {x} is not comparable with the vector {x1, x2}: they properly refer 
to two different “worlds”. 
Therefore it does not matter which particular way may be chosen to encode the 
input signal: if, for instance, the first receptor propagated the signals mirroring the 
way the single receptor in the first device propagates its signals, and if, at the same 
time, the second receptor did not propagate any signal at all, still the input signals of 
the two networks would be completely different. As long the “silent” receptor is 
connected to at least a node of the network the input code pertaining to the two 
devices will generate for usual string (12112) the following vectors: 
{ (1); (2); (1); (1); (2) } 
referring to the first network and 
{ (1,0); (2,0); (1,0); (1,0); (2,0) } 
referring to the second network. 
Finally, this is the set of m-functions generated by the second device: 
 
t0 t1  t0 t1
Ω2 = 0 → x1 + x2 < 2 
Ω1 = 0 
Ω2 = 0 
   
     
 2 ≤ x1 + x2 < 3 
Ω1 = 0 
Ω2 = 1 
 Ω2 = 1 → x1 + x2 < 1 
Ω1 = 0 
Ω2 = 0 
     
 x1 + x2 ≥ 3 
Ω1 = 1 
Ω2 = 1 
  1 ≤ x1 + x2 < 2 
Ω1 = 0 
Ω2 = 1 
     
    x1 + x2 ≥ 2 
Ω1 = 1 
Ω2 = 1 
 
The third example leads to a similar conclusion: this time the vector of input 




                                                
now the incoming signal in a three dimensional vector, which takes the place of the 
precedent two dimensional vectors realized by the other two structures. A neuron 
replaces the former red circuit and the threshold of the neuron Ω1 changes for the first 
time (the new threshold, 4, is written within the black circle), so that it will be 
activated only if it receives the correct input signal from the receptors and an 
activation signal from the other neurons. 
I think it is no longer necessary to show once more the new set of m-functions 
realized by this third network: the vector conversion differs from the former ones and, 
consequently, the description of the processes that make it possible must be different 
too. 
Summing up, a neural network realizes a sheaf of sets of m-functions7 defined 
by its architecture and by the computation performed by each single node of the 
network. The values assigned to the other variables, the main one represented by 
synapses weights, fix the constants for any specific set of m-functions within this 
sheaf. Every modification in the architecture of the network or in the processes of the 
single nodes leads to a system that could or could not solve a specific given task. For 
instance, considering only the usual simple inequalities such as the processes 
performed by the neurons, a neural network necessarily requires at least one of these 
architectural features in order to accomplish the known task8: 
1) A circuit. 
2) A link between nodes characterised by the same distance9 from receptor units. 
3) A feedback link that can propagate the signal coming from a neuron located at a 
higher distance to one located at a lower distance from receptors. 
 
7 For instance: the equation ( ax + by = k ) describes a sheaf of straight lines. If we fix the 
constants (in this case: a, b, k) attributing them a value, the result is the equation of a single 
straight line (e.g. 2x + 3y = 1). A set of straight lines describes more than one equation in 
which the constants have been fixed, when they are combined in single or multiple systems.  
8 This is a well known problem in the field of neural computation. The logical operator XOR 
is an example of this kind often cited in literature: it is known that there is no way to 
simulate this function with a single layer neural network (i.e. the architecture must consist 
of at least two layers). Many manuals analyse this problem: see, for instance, Stuart Russell 
and Peter Norvig 1995: ‘Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach’ Prentice Hall (chapter 
19, section 3) or Jeffrey L. Elman et al. 1996: ‘Rethinking Innateness – A Connectionist 
Perspective on Development’ (p. 354) 
9 In the graph theory (which is the mathematical theory of network), the “distance” dG(u, v) 
between two nodes u and v in a graph G is the shortest path (i.e. the shortest number of 




When we work with simple connectionist models, the sheaf of m-functions 
implemented is easily describable as previously presented. But even if the systems 
show a higher order of complexity (such as those proper of biological networks), it is 
possible to have an idea of the sheaf of m-functions determined by the architecture, 
especially considering that, though extremely complex, single neurons compute their 
electrochemical signals in a way that can be described with sets of m-functions. 
Finally, it should be clear by now that the three systems here pictured realize 
different m-functions, require different amount of energy and time to perform the 
same task and differ in the way the information is encoded or stored, in the categories 
developed and in their resistance to physical damages. In a few words, if we want to 
use Putnam’s identification with the Turing machine, they rely on a completely 
different set of instructions. But this conclusion seems to deny the main concept 
implied by the multiple realizability: how is it possible that contingency characterises 
the relation between mental and physical kinds, if all these variables entail a 
substantial difference in the m-functions realized? 
Anyhow, the problem that has given origin to this section is that it is not clear if 
any serial system such as a Universal Turing machine may o may not simulate the 
processes performed by parallel system: it seems to me that such a hypothesis is 
becoming less and less attractive. It can be argued that we could focus on the very 
task we are interested in, but this choice would lead to a partial description of the 
three systems: a complete description (which was in my opinion implied in Putnam’s 
early version of the multiple realizability theory) may only rely on the simulation of 
the whole set of m-functions. 
Still, the conceivability of a Turing machine able to replicate the m-functions of 
a biological system may be considered sufficient as the required evidence in support 
of multiple realizability. It has already been stated that the only way to find out if this 
mental experiment is true, is of the empirical kind. That is to say, it is necessary to 
verify if the set of “parallel system”-computable m-functions is a subset of the set of 
Turing-computable m-functions. At present we can only try to argue if such a 
hypothesis is as plausible as Putnam argued forty years ago. 
I consider three main reasons to doubt that it will be ever possible to proof such 
a hypothesis, especially if we consider the distributed processes that characterise 




                                                
1) In order to simulate m-functions of parallel systems with a virtual machine, we 
should take into account the valid argument Block and Fodor (1972) use to discard 
the FSIT theory 10 . According to the authors it is not possible to give a good 
explanation of simultaneous mental states using a single virtual machine. 
Nonetheless, it is also impossible to give a description of the unicity of the set of m-
functions performed by parallel systems using several probabilistic automata 
operating in parallel, unless we do not use them to simulate the processes in each 
single node of the network. This solution would anyway lead to a dead end: taken 
for granted the supervenience of the architecture in the generation of the sheaf of 
sets of m-functions per parallel system, the complete description of the system 
cannot rely on the simple gathering of the neural processes. 
2) It has already been mentioned that serial systems operate differently from 
parallel ones concerning the autonomous development of categories and (due to the 
same reasons) the reaction to unknown stimulation. These two features relate to the 
particular nature of parallel systems and I think they grant them the ability to work 
in the domain of infiniteness: a domain that the mechanical method cannot describe 
and that consequently leads to Turing-incomputable m-functions. It is known that 
parallel systems can deal with sets of infinite symbols as an input, being able to 
apply their processes to unknown stimuli as well as to known ones. It is true that 
external data can reprogram a Universal Turing machine to make it deal with new 
symbols: once the input has changed the set of instructions, the device can apply its 
rules to the once unknown data. Nonetheless, such a process does not simulate what 
happens in parallel systems which do not necessitate to change their m-functions in 
order to deal with the new input: the system automatically assigns a category to 
every input and it deals with that depending on the category. Once again, in order to 
simulate all the processes, the virtual machine is asked to deal with a potentially 
infinite set of symbols and, consequently, with an infinite set of instructions 
(clashing with the second requirement of the mechanical method), otherwise there 
will always be a difference between m-functions of the simulated system and those 
of the simulative system. 
3) It has been mentioned that deficits in the amount of energy may have a decisive 
influence on the m-functions the biological neural networks realize. The three 
 




                                                
structures presented as an example should also give an idea of another way to 
modify the m-functions, independently of the input of the system. Physical 
alterations (mainly structural damages or other changes in the architecture and 
chemical or electrical interference in electrochemical synapses or in the metabolic 
state of the neurons) directly modify the way the information is processed by the 
system, but cannot be considered as part of the input. A simulation with a Universal 
Turing machine cannot replicate these phenomena, despite the fact that they are 
mostly frequent in all living beings based on neural systems. To establish a 
comparison, physical alterations in serial devices produce system failures most of 
the time. Fodor used the argument of plasticity and degeneracy to propose his 
generalised version of the theory11, but it seems to me that this argument can be of 
good use also against the virtual machine hypothesis, at least until these systems 
will be able to realize m-functions only reprogrammable by means of the input.   
In conclusion, my thesis is that even if we can all agree that parallel systems 
realize some sort of m-functions that can be mathematically described, it does not 
follow that these m-functions can be multiply realized. Consequently, it cannot be 
drawn the conclusion that the relation established between the m-functions and the 
neural systems is contingent. Actually, the more science gives us tools to investigate 
these parallel distributed systems, the more it seems that the processes they implement 
are necessitated by the physical matter and are characterised by a series of unique 
features. 
In my opinion, Turing machines do represent an interesting example that helps 
us to understand what the relation between a device and the m-functions it realizes is, 
but it seems to me “overwhelmingly implausible” that these machines may ever be 
able to generate a complete simulation of the m-functions realized by parallel systems. 
The reasoning so far described leads to a controversial conception of the mental 
states: it has already been established the approximate identity in the following 
proportion: 
set of instructions : Turing machine ≈ m-functions : system mathematically 
describable 
It may be argued that this proportion implies the following new one: 
 




                                                
functional state : Turing machine ≈ assignation of values to all variables in the 
m-functions : system mathematically describable 
In the set of parallel systems (which is a subset of the systems mathematically 
describable), this proportion would imply that a particular kind of “activation pattern” 
would take the place of the third term. Though different from what Bechtel and 
Mundale defined in their article as “philosopher’s fiction”12, this would be anyway a 
completely theoretical object: a sort of photography of the entire structure, 
considering the whole network, the activation and metabolic status of all neurons and 
disposition of every synapse to propagate their signals. Consequently, every change in 
any of the variable involved, would generate a different set of instructions as well as a 
different “mental state”, a conclusion that seems to be highly counterintuitive. 
The alternative is also interestingly challenging: if the simulation with a virtual 
machine is not possible, maybe the second proportion is simply nonsensical. After all 
it may be necessary to take into consideration the hypothesis that there is not an 
equivalent in parallel systems for the functional state in Turing machines. 
Incidentally, it is to notice that these two alternatives coincide with the two 
“genuine options” J. Kim grants to a physicalist approach13: if the second one is 
clearly a form of eliminativism, the first is can be conceived as a hyper-local 




7. Pursuing a complete description (or: concrete problems of 
abstract functions). The precedent section constantly refers to the lack of 
plausibility to realize a complete simulation of all the processes implemented by 
parallel systems, due to their uniqueness. Assuming that the simulation has to focus 
on the problem “which device can compute what kind (sheaves) of m-functions”, it 
seems to me that there is no alternative left to an empirical investigation that might 
look for an answer to the question arisen by the proposed thesis: viz, do probabilistic 
automata realize m-functions implemented by parallel distributed systems?  
Nonetheless, the immediate objection is: why should we accept this 
assumption? Or, in other words, why should we focus only on complete simulations? 
 
12 See section 5. 




                                                
After all, there are many other strategies that seem to lead to good explanatory models 
of the mind. Furthermore, these strategies are also perfectly compatible with the 
multiple realizability theory and, consequently, the theory can support them with its 
strong appeal. 
I have briefly mentioned in the precedent section that Putnam’s hypothesis 
concerning the isolation (and description) of single mental states was influenced by 
the identification of the information processes in organisms with the ones in 
probabilistic automata. It is hard to imagine that, at the time he wrote ‘Psychological 
predicates’, the author meant anything different from what he clearly stated, for 
instance, in the following two passages: 
 
All organisms capable of feeling pain are probabilistic automata. (Putnam 
1967, p. 31).  
 
[...] identification of psychological states with functional states means that 
the laws of psychology can be derived from statements of the form “such-
and-such organisms have such-and-such Descriptions” together with the 
identification statements [...] (Putnam 1967, p. 33). 
 
It is not stated that they process information in a similar way: it is rather 
assumed that the probabilistic automata do simulate all the information processes 
implemented by any organism capable of feeling pain (i.e. in Putnam’s conception, all 
animal species). Furthermore, the Description (capital letter in the original quoted 
text) of the organism relies on the functional description of the probabilistic 
automaton that is simulating its processes. Therefore everything the theory implies, 
such as the truth value of the identification between mental and functional states, is a 
direct consequence of the truth value of these assumptions concerning the equivalence 
of information processes and their description in virtual machines and organisms. 
At any rate, the theory soon evolved abandoning the hypothesis of the identity 
between organisms and a single perfect description14: Putnam himself changed his 
mind in a series of articles published after his famous 1967 ‘Psychological 
 




                                                
Predicates’, claiming the multiple realizability of the mental states over the functional 
states15. In his entry in the Stanford Encyclopaedia, John Bickle writes: 
 
Notice that this argument for functionalism [i.e. Block and Fodor’s 
argument against any type identity] is explicitly non-deductive, in contrast 
to the deductive (and valid) nature of Putnam’s original argument against 
identity theories. It is important to keep the anti-identity theory argument 
separate from the pro-functionalism argument, as some criticisms of 
multiple realizability may be telling against one but irrelevant against the 
other. (Bickle 2006, third section in the web page: see references for 
details) 
 
An analysis of the generalised version of multiple realizability becomes now 
necessary because it seems to be immune from the criticism already arisen against the 
early version of the theory, due to its peculiar differences. This new version changes 
the object of the multiple realizations, leading to the “function” mentioned as the 
second “side of the coin” at the beginning of the precedent section. This new function 
is still conceived as similar to the functional state in a virtual machine and therefore it 
is still separable from the entire set of processes realized by the system, but it 
characterised by this feature on the basis of a different reasoning. In my opinion, this 
is the cause of a new series of problems that affects specifically the generalised 
version of the multiple realizability theory. 
It seems reasonable to gather all the paths that lead to preserve this particular 
feature of the function into three major categories even if they are related by the 
strong influence they exert to one another. The first choice is represented by a general 
concern about abstraction that I have already mentioned in the first chapter and that it 
is ascribable to Block and Fodor’s 1972 article (the argument against the FSIT) and to 
Fodor’s 1974 formalization of the generalized the theory. 
The second alternative is grounded on the analogy between organisms and 
artificial devices: the idea is that it is possible to identify a single “main task” within a 
device and that the “function” has a similar role in biological (or in general 
information processing) systems. These type of functions can be either considered 
 




                                                
self-evident or established a priori: the second variant is compatible with Shapiro’s 
conception of a taxonomic value for the functions and it is directly used in relation to 
biological systems. 
The final choice consists in claiming that a partial description may be 
sufficiently informative or characterised by a sufficiently elevated truth value: such a 
position usually aims at defending this type of investigation playing on its practical 
value. 
Concerning the first alternative, aiming at a more abstract idea of the object of 
the multiple realizations should not be considered an operation that can come without 
a price. Once the identity between the functional state and the mental state is 
abandoned, if the pivotal term used in the theory lacks a substitutive clear definition, 
it will eventually affect with its vagueness the whole new version of the theory. 
A major strength of Putnam’s hypothesis relies on the simplicity of the 
argument: 
1) Probabilistic automata can realize the same functional states, independently of 
the matter they are made of. 
2) More than one organism is able to be in the same mental state X. 
3)  Organisms which are able to be in a mental state X are probabilistic automata. 
4)  Organisms can be in the mental state X, independently of the matter they are 
made of. 
A probabilistic automaton has a unique best description of its processes 
coinciding with the formalization of its set of instructions by means of the adequate 
mathematical functions. Denying the existence of a best description for organisms 
entails denying the third point in the argument. 
Therefore, it seems that the identity between the mind and the virtual machine 
becomes an explanatory analogy in the generalised version. It is no longer necessary 
for an organism to be a probabilistic automaton, but to work like this virtual machine, 
processing information in a similar way and, consequently, allowing multiple 
realizations. 
If the theory were only grounded on its claimed plausibility, it would become a 
series of a priori statements as Zangwill hypothesised for the notion of functional 
isomorphism 16 . Thus, Fodor makes the theory avoid such a fate supporting the 
 




generalised theory with empirical findings as it has been described in the second 
section of this dissertation. But the identity between the functional state and the 
mental state is no longer granted, so that it can be questioned what the reference of the 
“mental state” exactly is, within this new version of the theory. 
It may seem a paradox, but, not counting Putnam’s first definition based on the 
identification, it is hard to find even a single definition in any of the articles dealing 
with the theory. The mental state is simply considered self-evident and characterised 
by features that can be established a priori: paraphrasing a judgement Paul 
Churchland (1981) expresses about the Folk Psychology theory (FP) in ‘Eliminative 
Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’, the mental state is characterised by an 
abstract nature, whose inexplicability in terms of physical constitution is directly 
caused by the very abstractness of its nature: it is self-referential. 
In the same article the author gives a detailed account of the reason why FP 
should be discarded: in brief, he asserts that the theory ‘is a stagnant or degenerating 
research program and has been for millennia’ (Churchland 1981, p. 75). What is more 
important for the purpose of this argumentation, when the author deals with the 
particular abstract nature of the functionalism in relation to the hypothesis of multiple 
realizations, he states that the theory expects the empirical findings to fit perfectly the 
a priori organization the theory imposes. In other words, functionalists use a method 
that subverts the standard scientific methodology: instead of grounding explanatory 
models on empirical findings, this theory builds the evidence to confirm itself. 
According to Churchland, the pivotal elements of the theory are self-confirmative, 
rather than self-evident. 
The author draws this conclusion after the analysis of the examples often used 
in the reasoning in favour of multiple realizations: the articles usually refer to 
mousetraps, corkscrews, carburettors, arithmetical calculator, valves and many other 
artefacts built to accomplish a specific predetermined task. Churchland’s criticism of 
this method of analysis is clear: 
 
Plainly, if FP is construed on these models, as regularly it is, the question 
of its empirical integrity is unlikely ever to pose itself, let alone receive a 





                                                
In addition, it seems to me that, if an abstract and all-embracing function 
becomes the object of multiple realizations, then the entire theory becomes as abstract 
as it is vague, losing its explanatory power. As Churchland points out, the theory 
inevitably becomes also unquestionable due to the elusiveness of its explananda.  
The author fairly considers the examples based on devices as questionable: they 
usually lack in representing both the dynamic nature of biological systems and the 
complexity of information processing system. The problem vividly reveals itself when 
these devices are used to pursue the second strategy included in the list, which focuses 
on the supposed identification of a main task in a device. 
There are at least three different ways to establish the function of a device and 
each of these ways may lead to a different conclusion. In order of importance: the 
purpose the device has been built for, its capacities (all the conceivable ways it can be 
used) and its primary uses (which may differ from those uses which were not “meant” 
when the object was created). 
This problem is not new, but it has been probably underestimated even by those, 
like Churchland, who wanted to belittle the usefulness of these analogies with the 
artefacts. Shapiro for instance, rapidly addressed it17: concerning the way to define a 
function on the basis of ‘purposes, capacities, contributions’, he concludes that ‘it may 
be possible that any of a variety of occupants can fill the role’ (Shapiro 2000, p. 643). 
In order to make the reasoning evident, let us consider the following devices 
realised by Jacques Carelman and presented in his famous ‘Catalogue d’objets 
introuvables’ (1969): the “Masochist’s coffee pot” (on the left) and the “Safety tap” 
(on the right). The former is probably perfectly described by its name, whilst the latter 
is described by the author: ‘if you forget to close a tap, the other will prevent the 
waste of water’18 (Carelman 1969, p.48). 
An interesting question would obviously be “what is the function of these two 
devices?”: in other words, we want to know what the purpose each device has been 
built for is, what their capacities, or their primary uses are. 
 
 
17 See also section 4 of the present dissertation. 
18 The book was first published in French and thanks to its success it was later on translated in 
other languages: I here report a personal translation from the 1978 Italian edition. See 






In the first case, the definition of a function depends on the person who is 
describing it: a masochist will have a different idea about the masochist’s coffeepot if 
compared to the one of a sadist or to the one of somebody who likes coffee and 
dislikes pain. Concerning the safety tap, it is stated that this device has the function to 
prevent the waste of water, but a quick analysis will easily reveal that the declared 
purpose of the author is nonsensical.  
As a matter of fact, the function of these “unobtainable objects” as conceived by 
their author, was probably to stress in a peculiar way the importance and the 
principles of a correct design even in the simplest everyday objects. Nonetheless, if 
we do not know anything about the author or about ergonomic theories, once we are 
asked to do it, we will try to look for some practical use for these objects, whether or 
not the author of the device conceived the function we imagine. In addition, it is likely 
that, being obscure their “main function”, each user will come out with a different 
idea about how to use the artefact and its capacities. 
The second device allows stressing a further problem with this strategy: each tap 
accomplishes a different task depending on the condition of the other. If the first tap 
(the closest to the wall) is open, the second has the function to prevent or to allow the 
water to run out of the pipe. But this tap is deprived of its function the very moment 
the first tap is closed: things can get even worse if both taps are closed so that none of 
them, considered separately, has effectively any function at all. Once again, these 




                                                
full of intriguing examples directed to challenge the idea of the existence of simple 
causes19. 
In conclusion, without a proper definition and left to the autonomy of the 
observer, the function of a device is under the authority of a point of view and a 
method of description. If this position is accepted, it entails that the function has 
become a chimera, even vaguer than the one generated by the aim at abstraction. Of 
course it can be objected that these objects are quite peculiar and have been chosen 
appositely because they can easily be negative examples for the strategy of the “main 
task”. It seems to me that such a criticism against the choices of these two devices 
would have the side effect to strengthen Churchland’s position against the choices of 
valves, carburettors and all the usual positive examples. 
The use of simple devices as analogies for information processes in the 
organisms do not seem to lead to a fruitful path: if it is applied to selected devices, it 
starts a confirmative procedure; on the contrary, if it is applied to generic devices, it 
happens that some of them would become negative examples discrediting the 
hypothesis of the existence of a “main task” to associate to the function. 
Despite all these consideration about the use of devices, it must be noticed that 
Carelman’s objects, though odd, do not show the complexity of a biological system 
and it is legitimate to assume that this reasoning centred on the selection of a single 
function becomes even more complex if the analysis focuses on biological systems 
and mental processes. So that, if it is not plausible to establish the “main task” of a 
mental state in a way that can be considered undisputable or straightforward, it has 
been mentioned at the beginning of this section that a variant to this so-called second 
strategy consists in attributing a taxonomic value to the functions. That is to say, it 
may be established, as proposed by Shapiro, that the reference of the functions must 
be fixed a priori in order to become a guideline for empirical researches in brain 
mapping. 
An interesting objection to this strategy relies on the possibility that our 
categories concerning the mental kinds are deceiving the physicalist approaches to the 
mental, once again generating confirmative procedures. This problem is being 
 
19 The tap example reminds me an example about two snipers often used in the theory of the 
cause. Considering two snipers shooting at the same time a deathly bullet against a target, if 
we apply a simple counterfactual strategy analysing the two events separately, none of them 
is effectively responsible for the death of the target. The action requires a complete 




investigated in the field of cognitive neuroscience: an example of this reasoning is 
Timothy Bussey and Lisa Saksida’s (2005) ‘Object memory and perception in the 
medial temporal lobe: an alternative approach’. Their findings come from the use of 
the fMRI and they have been used by the authors to overturn the usual conception of 
the normative role of the functions, re-establishing the supervenience of the physical: 
 
We would like to question the prevailing programme of trying to map 
psychological constructs such as ‘perception’, ‘semantics’, 
‘categorisation’, and other notions onto anatomical modules in the brain. 
Evolution did not design the brain according to psychological categories 
that we have just recently invented, although neuroscience would be much 
easier had she done so. Instead of restricting ourselves to this way of 
thinking, we suggest attempting to understand the functions of brain 
regions in terms of what computations they perform, and what 
representations they contain. (Bussey and Saksida, 2005 p.736) 
 
The position here supported is certainly controversial, but the idea that the 
taxonomic value of the functions may be considered an obstacle rather than a 
powerful tool, cannot be discarded without an accurate analysis. In particular, 
considering the empirical grounds of this thesis, for the time being the theory can be 
restricted within some specific fields, limiting its impact (the authors’ studies are 
focused on the phenomena of perception and memory). Nonetheless, from the point of 
view of the computational theory this approach is extremely tempting. As a matter of 
fact, the last part of the quoted passage is particularly important for the purpose of this 
dissertation because it suggests the supervenience of the computation performed 
towards the –abstract– functional level of analysis. Using the terminology fixed so far, 
the article states that, in order to understand the processes parallel systems realize, it is 
necessary to formalize their implemented m-functions. 
Finally, the last two steps in the present reasoning should lead to claim the 
weakness of the descriptions that come from the use of “function” in the generalised 
theory. First, it is important to remember that an analogy which is not characterised by 




                                                
single functions in the particular systems that implement mental processes is ill-
grounded. 
Concerning the first, we can claim, with Rosenberg (2001) that an insect and a 
human being are just two of the numerous examples of multiple realizability of the 
function “life”. These living beings share the same feature of being alive and are at 
the same time characterised by two completely different body structures. Nonetheless, 
using Bechtel and Mundale’s (1999) terminology, their multiple realization of life is 
only similar in a coarse analysis: if we use a fine analysis the systems show their 
differences, but the function they realise can no longer be considered just the rough 
“life”. Likewise, using Shapiro’s (2000) theorization20, it can be argued that this is not 
a proper multiple realization because it is applied to systems which do not differ in 
their “causally relevant properties” (i.e. they are both based on a helicoidal DNA or 
RNA molecular system21). In both cases the hypothesised multiple realizability is 
caused by both a generic definition of function and a mistaken interpretation of what a 
multiple realization should be. The hypothesis can be accepted as an example of 
multiple realizability, but in this case it does not result in a significant knowledge 
improvement or in a good description of the device. 
An adage says: “there is more than one way to skin a cat”. It is probably not 
controversial to concede that even if this statement asserts the multiple realizability of 
the function “to skin a cat”, the description of reality it gives is not at all informative. 
It should be considered entailing neither an interesting use of the theory, nor a useful 
reference for the term function.  
All paths here described are based on the idea that it is possible to select a single 
–best– function to assign to a mental state, isolating it from the rest of the system 
without altering its established function. This idea is supported by the analogy 
between the mind and the serial machine: going back to the exemplification of the 
state transition in these types of machines (A → B → C etc.), it is clear that each state 
can be isolated from the entire series of processes at no cost. The operation is also 
 
20 See section 4. 
21  Rosenberg uses the example of the prion as a molecule with hereditary function not 
composed of nucleic acid (i.e. without genetic material). Nonetheless this can hardly be 
considered as an example of living being and it is uneasy to show that this sub-microscopic 
protein can also have that hereditary function granted by the author. Once again the 
definition of the function realised grants or prevents the identification of multiple 




reversible: the set of instructions can be rebuilt putting in the right order each isolated 
state, so that the addition of the parts results in a description of the whole system. 
Due to the fact that the identity of the processes between serial systems and 
organisms (as hypothesised in the early theory) has been discarded and considering 
that an analogy has a weaker descriptive value than an identity, it is not granted that 
the isolation in a parallel system can be carried on without generating problems of any 
kind. 
As a matter of fact, from a mathematical perspective, it is not possible to isolate 
a single m-function within a description set, preserving at the same time the original 
computational value. Each m-function in the set is generated by a computational unit 
(a neuron) and it is organised in the set depending on the architecture of the neural 
network, so that the isolation of a single m-function entails the isolation of the part of 
the network that is realizing it. The architecture of the system analysed is 
consequently different from the original one and so is the computation the new system 
processes. Every selection of particular m-functions in the set leads to the same 
conclusion: the very moment a singular or a group of m-functions is selected within 
the original set, the selection generates a different system and consequently the 
analysis has changed its focus. From the point of view of the computation performed, 
the only possible description of a parallel distributed system is the complete one. 
The very idea of the partial descriptions as a general strategy is not free from 
theoretical problems. For instance, the double-slit experiment is famous in physics to 
show the dual nature of atomic and sub-atomic particles (i.e. they have a mass, occupy 
space and respond to forces but they also show a wave-like behaviour), entailing the 
dual nature of the matter itself. 
The explanation of the experiment requires the understanding of quantum 
physics and it is quite complex from a mathematical perspective, but for the purpose 
of this argumentation it is sufficient to describe the visible part of the experiment and 
what can be deduced from its observable results. Thus, let us suppose to have two 
screens, one in front of the other and the first one characterised by a slit, then let us 
randomly shoot small objects at the first screen. Some of these will go through the slit 
of the first screen, hitting the second screen: if they leave a mark where they hit, they 
will generate a pattern on the second screen, a bend whose dimensions will be similar 




the slit and rapidly diminishing towards the borders 
(image 1: each time an object reaches the black 
screen, it leaves a white dot as a mark). 
If we add a second parallel slit of the same 
dimensions and shape in the first screen and keep on 
shooting small objects at it, we will see a second 
bend on the second screen which will duplicate the 
features of the first one (image 2). 
Let us imagine now to shoot atomic particles 
at the screen, say electrons: these particles are still characterised by a mass, so it is 
presumable that they will leave a track on the second screen that is similar to the one 
left by the “small objects” just described. In the first case, with a single slit in the first 
screen, the assumption is correct and electrons do behave like any other object 
characterised by mass. But once the second slit has 
been opened, we have no longer two, but many 
bends: this is the typical pattern generated by wave 
interferences, so that it can be concluded (roughly 
speaking) that particles behave like small objects 
and like waves at the same time (image 3). 
Obviously, this is not the right context to go into details of quantum physics: 
what I am concerned of is that our focus of attention can easily give us a false idea of 
the phenomenon we are observing. If, for instance, we focus on specific parts of the 
second screen, trying to verify our first hypothesis (namely that particles behave 
mechanically like any other object in nature), we 
can easily locate the two bends we were looking for, 
being convinced that our assumption is right (image 
4: two bends within the two red lines).  
This way of dealing with the problem 
simplifies our understanding of the phenomenon: in the case of the interference 
pattern generated by particles, it is not possible to know, for instance, through which 
slit each particle goes, before it hits the second screen, leaving its mark. On the 




                                                
interested” in, it is easy to explain the motion of each particle simply knowing where 
it hits the second screen. 
Nonetheless, if our description of a phenomenon relies mainly on what we 
decide we want to focus on, the result is a description that leads to fallacies in the 
explanation model it produces. Sometimes a partial description is the only accessible 
description we can reach, but if it is only stirred by the choice of focus of analysis, 
then we are just using the wrong tool. The double slit experiment should exemplify 
the latter type of description: once we select the part of the second screen which is 
useful to verify our hypothesis, we manipulate the accessible data and what is a wrong 
explanation of a quantum phenomenon becomes perfectly plausible. Actually, such a 
selection would make the whole quantum phenomenon disappear in favour of the 
traditional mechanics. 
If it is accessible, a complete description of a phenomenon is to be preferred if 
compared to a partial one. In the case of the double slit experiment, the mathematical 
description of the motion of the particles shot at the screens is tricky indeed22, but it is 
the only one which gives us an explanation of the interference pattern visible on the 
second screen at the end of the experiment, once we decide to analyse it as a whole. 
I think parallel systems show a similar complexity: we can focus on a single part 
of the processes implemented by the system, but in this case there is the chance that 
the selection is modifying the processes analysed. In particular there is the risk that 
our hypotheses might be confirmed because of the categories used in order to select 
the data to analyse. A complete description can avoid these obstacles because it is 
directed to the interpretation of the processes occurring in the system as a whole: in 
the case of information processing systems (as it is the case for parallel distributed 
networks) the m-functions represent this complete description. Interestingly, this kind 
of description is close to what Putnam aimed at when he conceived the functional 
state level of analysis: his intention was to have an explanation of mental processes 
that could be independent from the contingent occurrence of the visible behaviour and 
from the assumptions of the identity theory. His picture of the whole information 
processing relied on the description of the state transitions and the identification of 
 
22 The mathematical description relies on a series of equations which describe each particle 
going through both slits, none of them, just the first slit and just the second: it is as if it 
becomes a wave when it reaches the first screen and then it becomes matter again before 




mental with functional kinds: the strategy here proposed reaches the same objectives 
(independence from the observable behaviour and from the concepts of the identity 
theorists) relying on the mathematical description of the m-functions and challenging 
the value of the usual definition of mental state. 
In conclusion, I consider multiple realizability as a powerful tool if restrained 
within specific borders. Anytime the processes realized by a particular system are 
inaccessible, the only way to attempt an analysis consists in assuming that another 
system, whose processes are accessible, is realizing some of the processes of the first 
inaccessible system. 
The analysis is then narrowed to a part of the whole set of processes of the 
accessible system: as a consequence, the new aimed description is partial and it is 
referred to this last system rather than to the original one. In other words, an analogy 
has been stipulated. 
Therefore my claim is that when multiple realizability is applied to neural 
systems, it is useful if conceived as an incomplete description of phenomena: a similar 
constraint does not entail to discard the theory as a whole because there are still cases 
in which there is no or little access to complete descriptions. Nevertheless, if a 
complete description is accessible, it must be preferred to the partial one achieved by 
means of the study of a similar system. If a process becomes suddenly accessible (as it 
has been happening in the past few years in the field of the mind studies), new 
descriptions will be formalized thanks to this change: on this new ground, new 
explanatory theories might be built, showing substantial divergence if compared with 
the ones formerly inferred on the ground of the indirect and partial analysis. 
Whilst attempting to defend multiple realizations from Shapiro’s arguments, 
Rosenberg states: 
 
In the philosophy of psychology, the multiple realizability thesis is a 
hypothesis advanced to explain the absence of discoverable 
psychophysical laws in a way compatible with physicalism. (Rosenberg 
2001, p. 369). 
 
It seems today that we are moving towards the finding of these laws: should this 




realizability tool will see the fields it has been applied so far restrained, in favour of 






The use of the term realization is not metaphysically neutral: in the past forty 
years it has implied a position in support of the supervenience of the “functional 
level” of analysis. The thesis I support in this dissertation is clearly in defence of 
reductionism, still the massive use of this term seems to me that does not invalidate or 
confuse the reasoning. 
My question relies on the use of this verb: when I ask “what m-functions do 
parallel systems realize?” I am assuming that the analogy between the mind and a 
virtual machine is at least an interesting way to focus on the study of information 
processes that are realized by the biological neural structure. Despite this disposition 
concerning the analogy, my point is that the question can only have an answer after an 
empirical investigation and, for the time being, all the evidence we have make the 
identification of the mind with any serial device extremely implausible. 
Therefore, if it is true (as mathematics show) that processes in the brain depend 
on many variables, the most important being the architecture and the single unit 
computation, the consequence that I draw from the assumption that “brain is realizing 
information processes” is that reductionism is an inevitable path. This is the only path 
that allows understanding qualitatively and quantitatively the variables mentioned 
and, therefore, this is the only way to find out the sheaves of m-functions 
implemented by these specific systems. 
There are many advantages in pursuing the use of mathematical descriptions as 
a tool to understand mind processes. The m-functions represent a complete 
description of the way every possible signal is computed by the system: they are not 
influenced by the presence of a specific stimulus or a combination of stimuli, neither 
they rely on the analysis of visible behaviours or other forms of output. As it was in 
origin conceived by Putnam concerning the set of instructions of a probabilistic 
automaton, the m-functions describe every possible process in the parallel system in 
each of its layers (input and output units included). 
What is more, these descriptions can give an explanation of processes that are 
caused by external physical or chemical interference, such as electro stimulation or 
inhibition of regions of the nervous system, injuries that cause physical alteration of 
the structure, chemical interference in the metabolism of the cells or in the synaptic 




concerning the micro stimulations of particular areas in the human cortex which 
generate sudden emotions in the patient: as I have tried to argue, these phenomena can 
hardly be explained with the classical use of the environment-reprogrammed Turing 
machine analogy. 
I think that the main difficulty in buying this thesis does not come from my 
assumption about the empirical need of verifying the kind of m-functions performed 
by parallel systems. The problem is that, as I just mentioned at the end of the sixth 
section, the fate of the “mental state” is uncertain. 
It has been argued that the conceptual possibility of isolating a single mental 
state, within the whole system of processes, has been influenced by the analogy with 
the Turing machine. My intention in the last section has been to show what reasons 
can be used to claim the inconsistency of this conceptual possibility, at least in the 
simple way it is usually taken for granted.  
Therefore, if we exclude the eliminativist position, the following proportion 
may be used as the starting point for a new analysis: 
functional state : Turing machine ≈ assignation of values to all variables in the m-
functions : system mathematically describable 
Biological neural networks are dynamical information processing systems, and 
consequently this reductionist perspective brings forth the concept of a “theoretical 
object” (or, as I have formerly defined it, a “photography” of the whole structure) that 
seems to be characterised by an unavoidable incoherence. This element can be 
considered sufficiently far from our perception of mental states to let us discard the 
whole thesis, on the basis of its implications. 
I think this would not be a good reasoning: an analogy with the field of analysis 
in mathematics1 should help in this case. A sheaf of straight lines can be studied both 
independently of the assignations of values to its constants and after the partial or 
complete assignation of the same values; the variables also contribute to locate 
specific parts or single points on the line analysed. As a consequence, it is perfectly 
plausible to imagine rules that can be applied in general to a biological parallel system 
(e.g. the computation performed by a single neuron is almost the same in every 
organism showing a central or distributed neural system: this is the assignation of 
value to a constant), others that are species specific (the macro structure of the neural 
                                                 
1 The part of mathematics concerned with the theory of (mathematical) functions and the use 




network shows its similarities) and finally those rules which are single-structure 
specific and vary within a single organism depending on its natural development, 
experience and accidents. The use of the fine and coarse grain of analysis, as 
described by Bechtel and Mundale (fifth section), should make it possible to generate 
a way to relate “mental states” (or their equivalent hypothesised theoretical object) to 
the variances here described across species or within the singular organism. 
In other words, this use of the mathematical descriptions does not lead to a 
hyper local reductionism: the single events in the flow of continuous processes of the 
system are still comparable within the same species with an acceptable fine grain of 
analysis. 
Nonetheless, if it is applied an extremely fine grain of analysis, this reductionist 
hypothesis entails that even a single organism would never experience exactly the 
same mental state. The problem is then how to reconcile the “m-function” approach 
with our personal experience about the coherence of mental states: when we recollect 
a precedent feeling of, for instance, hunger it does not seem different from the present 
one, despite the fact that the structure in the brain has meanwhile changed in its micro 
features.  
There are two hypotheses that have influenced my perspective concerning this 
problem. Gerald Edelman has formalized the first in a series of writings during the 
past two decades: his idea of the “remembered present” consists in assuming that a 
change in the structure of the system causes a change in the way memories are 
recollected and experiences are perceived because they are both implemented by the 
structure itself. The illusion of coherence is just the consequence of the change of the 
tool used to compare past and present experiences. 
The second hypothesis has partially been mentioned in this dissertation and 
relies on Churchland’s position against folk psychology: our perception about the 
coherence of mental states during our life may be as affected by fallacies as, for 
instance, our perception of motion of the sun during the day. 
Symmetrically, going back to Putnam’s starting point, the hypothesis of 
coherence of a single mental state across species, or even in alien species and 
computers, needs to be proved empirically or to be sustained by an adequate 
(complete) description of the processes that realize it. Otherwise, there is no reason to 
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